LEECH LAKE BAND OF OJIBWE
To: Leech Lake Tribal Court Administrator and
Michael Garbow, attorney for Plaintiffs, Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe, 115 Sixth Street NW, Suite E, Cass Lake, Minnesota 56633.
to Rule 38 of the LLBO Judicial Code, Title II, Part VII, Petitioners
Reconsideration of the Court’s Order filed February 22, 2005, in light
new facts and evidence, additional supporting law, waiver of
of an available and fully seated Appellate Court for the LLBO and new
increasing constitutional violations surrounding the continued use of
police by elected officials against the Plaintiffs since original
submissions and oral arguments December 16, 2004.
Plaintiffs’ present action includes allegations of constitutional violations by Leech Lake Tribal Police officers including; unlawful searches, seizures and unjust taking by Defendants and wrongfully denied money not reimbursed. Additionally, Plaintiffs alleged a variety of torts including Wrongful Termination (tortuous interference with implied contract employment), Defamation and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED). This Court issued an Order of Dismissal (without prejudice) for Plaintiffs’ failure “to cite to any authority for this Court to award monetary relief against the Defendants” and/or “any law preserving [Plaintiffs] employment separate and apart from the Band’s personnel manual” and because “the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has rejected claims of discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 based upon alleged political discrimination” and finally because the Court is not aware of any court ruling that the immunity of tribal officials is waived for such conduct.” (Order citations omitted).
filings and oral argument it has become abundantly obvious to
the Anishinabe People of Leech Lake that the Defendants have
pattern and practice of willfully directing the tribal police to
personal agendas of intimidation and civil rights abuses, which now
the filing of false police complaints by Defendants, against Plaintiffs
alleging terroristic threats and now,
finally, the arrest and incarceration of the newly re-elected
Secretary-Treasurer Archie LaRose for trespass at the Palace Casino in
Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
As part of the COOPERATIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE LEECH LAKE BAND OF OJIBWE INDIANS AND THE COUNTIES OF BELTRAMI, CASS, HUBBARD, ITASCA, AND THE CITY OF CASS LAKE, MINNESOTA (hereinafter CLEA) Defendants, which include officers of the Leech Lake Tribal Police Dept. (LLTPD) herein agreed “to waive its sovereign immunity with respect to claims arising this liability” and
be subject to liability for its torts and those of its officers, employees, and agents acting within the scope of their employment or duties arising out of a law enforcement agency function conferred by section 626.84, subd. 1, paragraph (h), to the same extent as a municipality under Chapter 466 of Minnesota Laws.
Additionally, because the Band’s Peace Officers have become licensed under Minn. Stat. § 626.93
the Band files with the Minnesota Board of Police Officers Standards and Training a bond or certificate of insurance for liability of its law enforcement officers, employees, and agents for lawsuits under the United States Constitution.
added). Essentially, the LLBO tribal
government has agreed to be treated like a city or county of the state
Minnesota, subject to state laws like any other municipality and
carry the equivalent tort liability insurance policies applicable under
law regarding exercise of police powers.
Jurisdictions and Rights of Plaintiffs
Because Minnesota Chapter 466 provides for liability of lawsuits under the United States Constitution, the related searches, seizures, unjust takings and deprivations of the due process and equal protection rights and liberties afforded to all citizens of the United States now pass to Plaintiffs herein under the fourth, fifth and fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution, as well as all the Art XIII Rights of Members as “no [MCT] member shall be denied any of the constitutional rights or guarantees enjoyed by other citizens of the United States . . .” Because state law is now implicated under the Defendant LLBO’s waiver of sovereign immunity, the matter could also be removed federal court for diversity or federal question, much less 42 U.S.C. 1981 et seq. State law provides for a jury in criminal defamation cases, and Plaintiffs desire to exercise their right to jury for any matter or question of fact. Therefore, from a jurisdictional standpoint, Plaintiffs may bring this legal action in state, federal or the Leech Lake Band’s court without surrendering or waiving any of the other rights and privileges of a concurrent jurisdiction.
For to long Indians have been more
subject to double jeopardy for incidents or occurrences and
tribal government and its elected officials should also be held to same
standard. Plaintiffs herein do not
waive their rights individually or collectively to a jury or other
or procedural rights available in state or federal court jurisdictions.
Plaintiffs do want to have matters such as these presented in the
Complaint, Supporting Memorandum of Law and other Affidavits and
resolved for the Anishinabe People in a Tribal Court forum, but also
convenient venue for enforcement, because
Plaintiffs also recognize the past reality of Defendants’ open defiance
tribal court orders and disrespect of judicial authority.
Authority for monetary Damages
Chapter 466 Tort Liability, Political Subdivisions
The certificate of insurance under the CLEA requires the Band to
obtain and maintain insurance policies for commercial general liability, police professional liability . . . with minimum liability limits at the maximum amounts set forth in Minnesota Statute Section 466.04. Failure to maintain the insurance coverage required by this agreement shall cause immediate termination of the agreement.
provides that “every municipality is subject to
its torts and those of its officers, employees and agents acting within
scope of their employment or duties whether arising out of governmental
proprietary function.” Liability of any municipality on any claim .
. . shall not exceed . . . $1,000,000.00 for any number of claims
of a single occurrence, for claims arising on or after January 1, 2000.”
Plaintiffs Complaint seeks a Judgment in excess of $2,000,000.00 for
distinct occurrences, the first on June 10, 2005 and the second on June
2005. “The limitation imposed by this
section on individual claimants includes damages claimed for loss of
or loss of support arising out of the same tort.” Here, Plaintiffs have lost all services and
financial support for themselves and their families as a direct cause
Defendants actions, acts and omissions as a municipality under Chapter
the CLEA. Therefore, a legal basis and
authority for Plaintiffs claims and recovery for damages clearly exists
1. Abuse of Police Powers
When Plaintiffs Baird and Bibeau were terminated from their governmental employment on June 10, 2004, Defendant “Wilson and four Leech Lake Tribal Police Officers came into the Legal Department . . . and two of the Tribal Police Officers left with Veldon Baird.” As Plaintiff Bibeau was packing up his personal possessions and loading his van “Luke stopped him to look through the boxes . . . [and] Luke took a Leech Lake Ordinance book from one of the boxes.” “When Frank said that he had to return it to Rich Robinson [sic][Jones], Luke said he would return it to Rich.” “Luke said that Korey was the acting director and that I was not to allow Frank back in the office without a Leech Lake Tribal Council Member or a Tribal Police Officer.” It is abundantly apparent from Gale’s Affidavit that Defendant Wilson was directing and ordering the tribal police officers’ duties and acts during this entire event, which is further supported below by officers’ reports.
Officer Schwartz is very clear in his Initial Complaint Report (ICR) that he “was dispatched to the Leech Lake Legal Office. Asst. Chief J. Wind advised me that the Tribal Council wants to have an Officer in uniform present.” Officer Schwartz then reports that “Wilson and Wind stated they don’t anticipate any problems.” “I overheard Bebeau [sic] tell Wilson several times to relax that he is only taking his personal stuff, and nothing of the Tribes.
Interestingly enough, Defendant Assistant Police Chief Wind’s ICR gives a third version of events, which ICR report has its own internal conflicts and conflicts with the other two afore-mentioned Defendants’ exhibits. Under the item “Details:” Defendant Wind writes “Officer was asked to be a presence while District Rep. Wilson handed termination letters to Mr. Bibeau and Mr. Baird.” Under “Disposition:” Defendant clearly reports that “this Officer went inside the office of Mr. Bibeau with Mr. Wilson and observed Mr. Wilson hand letters to Mr. Bibeau and Mr. Baird . . .” Defendant Wind also reports that “this Officer did observe District Rep. Wilson inventory all items Mr. Baird wished to remove from his office” and similarly “this Officer did observe District Rep. Wilson inventory all items Mr. Bibeau wished to remove.” Oddly, Defendant Wind then states that “this Officers assistance with this process or escort was never asked by Mr. Bibeau or District Rep. Wilson. At no time other then [sic] to use the restroom facility did this Officer or Officer Schwartz enter the building or office of Mr. Bibeau.” Officer Schwartz also states that “I along with Wind stood outside the front door of the building . . .” Ms. Gale reports that “the two Tribal Police Officers and Luke Wilson . . . remained in the reception area the entire time.” Plaintiff Bibeau previously reported in his Affidavit for the same event that
on June 10, 2004, Defendant Wilson with the aid, protection and escort of Assistant Leech Lake Tribal Police Chief John Wind and/or a second officer did serve the above-mentioned Judge Fineday Order and termination memorandum on me in my office workplace [and] did personally search through my personal effects and did seize and hold some of my personal property, files and other valuables without consent during the removal from employment.
Also, Exhibit FB2 (attached to the first Aff. of Bibeau) is the only report or ICR 20044-03362 for that event which Plaintiff Bibeau was able to obtain from the Leech Lake Tribal Police during a prior in-person request. That ICR identifies “Reported By: Luke Wilson” and the Complaint: RTC [Defendants] requested officers presence during removal.” Concluding with “Disposition: 413 [Schwartz] responded.”
Clearly, the RBC and Tribal Police Defendants are attempting to mislead the court regarding their individual and official roles during this event. However, this was not the first time, and now more obviously not the last time, the Defendant RBC members ordered and directed the tribal police to be present and take actions contrary to probable cause, necessity, court order or law.
Earlier that same day on June 10, 2004,
Defendants Wilson, Losh and Robinson by and through their counsel Defendant Garbow, solicited and received an Emergency Ex Parte Order against Secretary-Treasurer Arthur LaRose with Leech Lake Tribal Court Judge Fineday with regard to the matter entitled LLBO; Wilson v LaRose CV-04-108, for the express purpose of taking control of the accounting department and financial information, alleging election tampering and vote buying. (See Order by Honorable Anita Fineday dated June 10, 2004).
According to ICR 20044-03358, Defendant “Luke Wilson . . . requested an officer to standby at an emergency hearing at the Tribal Courts” on June 10, 2004 at “0841.” The initial Civil Complaint for Emergency Order filed by Defendant Garbow on behalf of Defendants Wilson, Losh and Robinson was previously provided as Exhibit M2. It appears that Defendants planned to use the tribal police as part of their plan to take control of tribal government against then Secretary-Treasurer LaRose.
The next occurrence using tribal police was June 24, 2004, when
the then three, elected Defendant Representatives under guise of having an “Acting Chairman” in Defendant Wilson and with the direct aid and support of Defendant attorney Garbow continued to take additional actions in furtherance of Defendants’ conspiracy by arbitrarily, involuntarily terminating, laying off and/or transferring various Business Corporation employees under a broad cloud of retaliation and defamation . . .
While the significance of this pattern and practice of using the police was not readily understood by Plaintiffs at the time, the Tribal Police have continued to play a significant role in violating civil rights and liberties of Plaintiffs when directed by the RBC Defendants. Plaintiff Bibeau noted that the
presence of police officers, guns and perceived threat of incarceration or greater loss of personal items by Defendants did intimidate me and other co-workers present in the workplace, because co-workers were not certain if I was being arrested or if they may also be the next future subject for police removal and public spectacle.
Intimidation and the creating of defamation spectacles appear to be the primary uses of the tribal police by Defendants in a number of events/occurrences continuing through the present filing of this instant Reconsideration request to the Court. In October,
the Court noted that the Election Board Plaintiffs in Jackson “were not given prior notice of their removal and were removed from their offices under police escort. Additionally, it appears that in response to a call from Sally Morrison, Interim Executive Director, a reporter from the Bemidji Pioneer was present to photograph Plaintiffs being removed from their offices.”
In that case, it appears that Defendants (many of whom are the same for both matters) were broadening their defamatory tactics to include use of the press media, hoping for a photograph in the newspaper to further publicize, defame and intimidate the Anishinabe People with their tribal police power actions.
This year in January, additional tribal members who are no longer employees of the LLBO revealed that they had been subjected to unlawful searches and seizures of the person during what appeared to be part of employer progressive discipline interviews.  The employees perceived they participating in an employee progressive disciple process which included an employer investigator giving Miranda Warnings without identifying himself as a police officer. The interrogations were conducted in a closed room with two other individuals present and the employer’s investigator had a gun and a badge on his belt.
According to the end of the transcript, Christopher Bedeau was terminated by his supervisor, Defendant Rodney White herein saying “based on the circumstances of the investigation, and other activities with yourself and . . . Tribal Council has directed me to present this [termination] letter to you.” If Bedeau was pre-determined to be fired, and no police complaint had been filed, what legitimate role does the officer play? Bedeau was subjected to an illegal search and seizure of the person, including false imprisonment with the closed door and three (3) people, including one with a gun.
Most recently on Friday, February 25, 2005, Plaintiff Bibeau was
present for Archie LaRose’s swearing in along with other press/media and elders and that [he]was verbally told by Defendant Luke Wilson “you can’t be in here, the RBC issued a restraining order against you and you aren’t allowed on any tribal land or in any tribal buildings.”
When Bibeau inquired as why, Executive Director, Lenee Ross responded saying “you made comments about guerilla and al queda tactics” and that “Tribal Police Chief Day had signed the affidavit.” When Bibeau requested a copy of the restraining order and affidavit Defendant Garbow responded “Affidavit? It’s a police report!” When Bibeau asked a second time for the restraining order and police report Garbow responded “its in the works!” Plaintiff Bibeau was not given any of the requested documents or proof.
Ironically, on Monday, February 28, 2005, Plaintiff Bibeau was “called by tribal police [for his location] to be served some papers, which were served [upon him] at the Cass County Courthouse soon after.” The RBC restraining order and casino exclusion notice were all dated Thursday, February 24, 2005. Apparently, in-person, hand-delivery service by tribal police officer is the preference of Defendants to add spectacle and defamation. Upon reading the served papers and verifying the false allegations by the Tribal Police Chief Steven Day, Plaintiff Bibeau
visited the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Bemidji and was informed by Special Agent Engelhof that he received the police report from Chief Day along with the 44-page Memorandum of Law in Support of the Complaint for Civil Rights and Liberties.
Storbakken has also
received similar false police reports, RBC restraining orders from
headquarters and tribal offices and notice of exclusion from the casinos,
all of which buildings and facilities are located on tribal land and
tribal services are provided to the Anishinabe People of Leech Lake. It has been reported that Plaintiff
Storbakken was physically removed from the tribal headquarters, March
2005. Last Friday, “the tribal police
arrested Secretary-Treasurer LaRose on February 25, 2005, his first day
office and took him to the Cass County jail in Walker, Minnesota.”
2. Municipal Liability
Because of the CLEA, the LLTPD officers are expected by state law to treat all citizens within the state similarly under equal protection concepts, because the LLTPD officers are licensed under state law and Peace Officers Standards and Training (POST) Board certifications of training. Therefore, the citizens within the state of Minnesota have equal rights and liberties to be protected when encountering LLTPD officers, whether the state citizens are Indians or non-Indians. Under Chapter 466, the LLBO as a municipality agrees to operate its police force in a manner treating ALL people equally, with fairness and due process. The real question is could the LLBO could get a county or city municipal law enforcement agency to carry out the variety tasks herein contained and all the other filings and records regarding this matter?
The LLTPD officers operate within a Public Law 280 framework, using municipal liability as the penalties for violating the lawful boundaries for police conduct. In many ways the LLBO Defendants are learning new how the use of police powers are restricted by constitutions and civil rights and liberties. However, Defendant Garbow previously worked as an assistant Beltrami County Attorney in his immediately former employment, frequently interacting with a municipal law enforcement agencies and officers and carrying out criminal prosecutions. Defendant Garbow, of all parties to this matter, has the most direct understanding of the broad restrictions placed on government and the use of police powers. Here in the present matter, Defendant Garbow knew or should have known the municipal standard expected and must therefore be held to possess imputed, higher knowledge of the limits and restrictions on police powers, unwarranted searches, seizures, deprivations and takings, especially with powers of incarceration.
of the police on the LLTPD, including LLTPD Chief Steven Day, have
municipal experience and have years of training and are MN POST Board
certified. The reason for the Miranda
Warning was “because police acting on their own cannot be trusted.” The filing of a false police
report/complaint is a crime under MN law. It is
apparent that Defendants herein have
the training and experience required to exercise police powers as a
municipality but have intentionally chosen to operate outside state law
believing tribal sovereignty is a shield to liability.
This attitude is subject to the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Monell below. It is readily apparent that Defendants will
continue their civil rights abuses and liberty deprivations using
and unreasonable police powers against the Anishinabe People,
and others similarly situated until prevented by a higher authority.
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA)
restraint the ICRA is intended to impose on tribal government has not
realized by the Anishinabe People and Plaintiffs of Leech Lake
Reservation. The Tribal Court is being
circumvented by the RBC Defendants who pick and chose who to abuse with
exercise of their police powers. Consequently, the ICRA seems to have
more short comings of regular justice by enabling tribal
deprivations of civil rights. However,
the CLEA’s waiver of sovereignty and agreement to be treated like a municipality
grants all the same rights and protections as non-Indians in all other
circumstances. Therefore, the limits of
remedies of injunction and declaratory relief no longer hold true due
alternative jurisdictions and rights available.
Reconsideration Tort Analysis
While Plaintiffs have filed a Motion for Time to Brief the Torts, a small analysis follows to support the Motion for Time to Brief Torts. The Court in its Order of Dismissal cited to US v. Sperry (1989, citation omitted) to point out that “failure to pay money obligation does not rise to the level of a taking under the fifth amendment.” In the present matter, actual out-of-pocket money was expended for the benefit of the employer, defendant government, in the routine course of providing services as an employee with expectation of reimbursement, is being denied and withheld and not being reimbursed to Plaintiff following multiple requests. In Sperry the governmental “takings” were user fees charged by the federal government for the freezing and recovery of Iran’s banked funds which became available as damages, for those plaintiffs following the actions following the Iranian Hostage Crisis. Here the res is not user fees but actual, out-of-pocket expenditures by the wrongfully terminated employee in the normal course of his duties for the Defendant employer.
Similarly, denying the wrongfully terminated employees their “right of appeal” under the LLBO Human Resource Polices and Procedures should be given more weight. Plaintiffs previously pointed to LLBO tribal court case law precedent in Jones v LLBO, where that court held employment under the LLBO policies and analogized Minnesota state law rises to implied-contract employment. Most federal, state, county, city and other municipal employees receive the minimal due process of notice and opportunity to be heard before termination, police removal or other adverse action by government.
The Defendants, a faction of the LLRBC called on police to assist in the wrongful termination of the tribal attorney, to make sure any resistance could be dealt with by threat of force, incarceration and greater loss of personal belongs. Plaintiff Bibeau was intimidated and feared that the afore mentioned methods were ready to be used and was coerced into submission to preserve his personal freedom and retain maximum personal belongings in the best condition possible.
If addition to the LLBO HR policies, the LLBO re-affirmed the LLBO Tribal Government Code of Ethics in June of 2003, which included the three District Representative Defendants who conspired with the tribal police to wrongfully terminate Plaintiffs herein on two different occurrences in June, the 10th and 24th. In that Code of Ethics “members of the [RBC} as subject to the highest standards of ethical conduct” and “shall have a solemn duty to
Use official authority properly and with respect for Band employees, laws, and policies and procedures. Tribal Council members must take particular care not to abuse their authority over Tribal Government. The laws policies and procedures of the band apply to them to the same extent as to other members of Tribal Government. The use of threats of reprisal . . . to pressure Band employees to take inappropriate actions on behalf an elected official . . . is an abuse of authority.
Additionally, the three District Representatives Defendants also signed Exhibit M4, which is a memo demonstrating their “concurrence” which declares that
an individual Tribal Council member has neither the authority to change policy or procedure not the authority to hire, fire, promote, or transfer employees. Any amendment or revision to existing policy and procedures can only be done by majority vote of the Tribal Council at a special meeting or regular meeting.
The very day that
and Bibeau were terminated, June 10, 2004, was the day following
of Elections results and resignation of Chairman White.
The only meetings were by Defendants
conspiring to use outside, secret legal counsel to takeover RBC
tribal police to secure it from the duly elected Secretary/Treasurer,
LaRose and to wrongfully terminate employees in violation of various
laws; and particularly violating the Code of Ethics section which
the RBC “shall have a solemn duty to. . . not misuse their positions
political purposes.” But for
Defendants “abuse of authority” and unwarranted use of tribal police
carry out and enforce their personal, political attacks of reprisal in
violation of LLBO Band laws, Plaintiffs would not have been harmed.
Right to Employment
At common law the LLBO government employment relationship is that of an implied contract, not at-will and therefore by Defendants actions alleged above have “breached the implied contract of employment” which is also a “breach of good faith and fair dealing.” Defendants wrongly declare themselves to be an “at will” employer. In Jones, the Court took particular note of the LLBO Human Resources (HR) policies pointing out that
[t]he subject policy establishes specific procedures and conditions to be followed prior to termination. It includes progressive discipline measures and provides a grievance procedure. The grievance procedure includes an appeal of termination to an appeals committee. The decision of the appeals committee is final under 300.7(c). The Band’s personnel policy provides at Part 100.3: Employment at will: [‘]Just as an employee of the LL Band of Ojibwe is free to end their employment and any point in time, the LL band of Ojibwe Administrative staff reserves the rights to terminate an employee’s employment in accordance with these policies.” (Emphasis in original).
emphasized words appear in
Defendant Garbow’s letter in response to Plaintiffs’ request for
terminations. However, Defendants’ actions are not in accordance with the established LLBO
HR policies, which HR policies very much mirror the constitutional
due process provisions of the ICRA. Additionally,
the LLBO re-affirmed the Code
of Conduct Ordinance in June 2003.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq.
Government liability for local government as a municipality for claims like 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was previously determined by the United States Supreme Court in Monell where that court determined that
when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983 . . . [as] this case unquestionably involves official policy as a moving force of the constitutional violation . . .”
Recognizing the allegations in the original Complaint and Supporting Memorandum of Law regarding the unlawful use of tribal police to conduct search, seizure to carry out the alleged torts against Plaintiffs in light of the required and express waiver of sovereign immunity by Defendants, legal authority for this Court to award monetary relief against the Defendants exists and has now been properly provided to this Court.
The Court also pointed to Shortbull v Looking Elk as showing that the Eighth Circuit has “rejected claims of discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 based upon alleged political discrimination.” Shortbull is distinguishable because Thomas Shortbull was a non-enrolled member of the Oglala who desired to be a candidate for tribal president, under a tribal ordinace that required candidates to be “enrolled.” Shortbull argued he was denied because of his individual political opposition, like in the Means case before on that reservation years before and also used herein as a model. The Shortbull Court went on to point out that “the ultimate test, of course, is whether the classification is sufficiently "invidious" so as to fall within the statute's ambit.” The Shortbull Court also concluded that
the term class-based animus does not include personal animus, and cases cited therein, and Shortbull's allegation that appellees discriminated against him because of his individual political opposition to them is not actionable under s 1985(c).
The class in this present matter is actually created by the Defendants’ decision of which employees to wrongfully terminate as part of their invidious animus towards LaRose particularly, and to achieve the takeover of governmental control. The Shortbull Court did “express serious concern that Shortbull's rights under s 1302 of the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) may never be vindicated, as did the Court in the present matter. Plaintiffs herein are victims of a class-based animus, even if Plaintiffs cannot articulate clearly the name of the animus, especially because many Plaintiffs were not political supporters but perceived to be in support of LaRose or White by Defendants. Therefore, making pinpoint, invidious, class naming guess work. The Shortbull Court concluded by commenting that
We question whether such a result is justified on the grounds of maintaining tribal autonomy and self-government: it frustrates the ICRA's purpose of "protect(ing) individual Indians from arbitrary and unjust actions of tribal governments," and in this case it renders the rights provided by the ICRA meaningless.
At least in
Gallegosm the Plaintiff
had the benefit of the administrative process. Here
Defendants as a faction of the RBC and their attorney
Garbow, decided that Plaintiffs do not get to have the appeal process
hearing proscribed by Band law. The
Order of Dismissal sends the signal that laws only apply to the ruled,
ruling, and government can take and keep money without notice or cause.
Here and now, even more extreme and outrageous police conduct has occurred against Plaintiffs including a recent filing of false police complaints (ICRs). The LLTPD and LLBO tribal government and actors have now become inextricably intertwined, the LLBO directs police actions to unreasonably and without cause or warrant, intrude on Plaintiffs lives so as to continuously add and increase spectacle and defamation. Plaintiffs are concerned that the LLTPD will falsely report possession of weapons and other falsehoods to force a police shooting or cause other intrusions or harms to Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs pray this Court will Reconsider the Order of Dismissal, or in the alternative Grant a Stay of Judgment on the original Order of Dismissal filed February 22, 2005, and Grant a transfer of Venue to Federal Court as there appears to be mix of civil and criminal conduct no alleged against Defendants. Plaintiffs understood the Court was taking arguments for tribal sovereignty December 16, 2004. Plaintiffs would request time to more fully brief and argue orally the torts related to this present action now that excessive police involvement and direction thereof by RBC has been demonstrated thereby incorporating the waiver of sovereign immunity for this matter.
WHEREFORE, based upon all the previous and current filings and records contained herein Plaintiffs pray for judgment as follows:
1. Amend the Complaint caption to include LLTPD Chief Steven Day as a named Defendant.
2. Grant the Motion to Reconsider or Transfer to federal court jurisdiction due to various rights of Plaintiffs and criminal laws implicated.
3. Grant the Application for stay of Judgment until other remedies requested have been granted or completed.
4. Accept the Memorandum of Law in support of all the motions as a brief for the purposes of Notice of Appeal.
5. Declaring that Defendants have acted unlawfully and outside the scope of their authority and did conspire to discriminate against and deprive Plaintiffs of their several civil rights under the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §1981 et seq.
6. Declaring that Plaintiffs were never given the benefit of Band proscribed due process regarding the appeals of their terminations from employment and are entitled to be returned to their previous or comparable positions with all back pay and benefits due; or in the alternative if Plaintiffs are do not feel safe to return they will be fully compensated for past quantum meruit, past lost earnings and benefits as well as loss of reasonable future earnings.
7. Declaring that Defendants did act with malicious intent to defame, harm and injure Plaintiffs individually in their person, profession and livelihood and have therefore committed defamatory acts against Plaintiffs for which Defendants are personally and individually liable for damages.
8. Declaring that Defendants have cause widespread intentional infliction of emotional distress for Plaintiffs’ spouse, children and/or families by causing financial hardship, using public defamation and other overt acts of oppression to publicly ridicule and humiliate and therefore Defendants committed acts causing the intentional infliction of emotional distress to Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ families for which Defendants are personally and individually liable for damages.
9. Declaring that the Tribal Police acted unlawfully and unconstitutionally when searching and seizing Plaintiffs’ personal possessions, files, work product and other private case information, without a warrant or other lawful court order to aid in Defendants defamation and ridicule to harm Plaintiffs and therefore such items must be returned to the Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs must be compensated for the damages.
10. Declaring that Defendant RBC members’ actions and directions of Tribal Police have now become inextricably intertwined as the LLBO directs police actions to unreasonably and without cause or warrant, intrude on Plaintiffs lives so as to continuously add and increase spectacle and defamation.
11. Declaring that Defendants have committed an unjust taking against Plaintiff Bibeau as described above and by not reimbursing his personal costs/expenses in performing his previous job duties which are provided for under the LLBO policies and he must be compensated for the damages.
12. Encouraging that Defendants enter into a Consent Judgment with Plaintiffs to develop an independent LLR civil service commission to establish a merit system for equal rights hiring practices and a termination review board to provide for due process reviews, free of Defendants’ or future RBC’s control and interference.
13. Ordering Defendants pay attorney fees and costs as provided under 42 U.S.C. 1998(b-c).
14. Ordering punitive damages for Plaintiffs’ other pain, suffering, losses and general home environment and families’ emotional hardships associated with Defendants’ extreme and outrageous defamatory acts.
15. Judgment of at least of $1,000,000.00, for each the two occurrences provided in the present matter under Minn. Ch. 466 municipal liability.
16. For such further relief as the Court may deem just, fair and equitable.
Dated: March 4, 2005
Attorney for Plaintiffs
51124 County Road 118
Deer River, Minnesota
 CLEA Sections 2 and 12 dated October 5, 2000, 2(a), page 1, see copy attached as Exhibit M2R 1
 Id. at Section 2 and 13.
 Id. item 2(d and g), emphasis added.
 See Also Minnesota Chippewa Tribe Constitution, Art. XIII Rights of Members “no [MCT] member shall be denied any of the constitutional rights or guarantees enjoyed by other citizens of the United States . . .”
 Minn. Stat. 631.06.
 Id. item 13, p. 5, See also item 12 Liability for torts and waiver of sovereign immunity.
 Minn. Stat. § 466.02.
 Minn. Stat. § 466.04 (3).
 Id. subd. 2.
 Aff. of Samantha Gale, Items 2 and 3, dated December 28, 2004, previously attached as Exhibit F to Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss Base on Sovereign Immunity dated January 3, 2005.
 Id. at Item 3.
 Richard Jones is a co-Plaintiff in the instant matter and owner of the notebook seized by Defendant Wilson.
 Id. at Item 5.
 Initial Complaint Report (ICR) 044-03362 “Officer Presents [sic] request” dated 6-10-2004, previously attached as Exhibit G to Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss Base on Sovereign Immunity dated January 3, 2005.
 Schwartz ICR 044-03362, ¶ 2.
 Aff. of Gale at Item 6.
 Aff. of Bibeau dated December 4, 2004, Items 9 & 10.
 Id., Ex. FB 2
 Id., Item 5.
 See Id., ICR 20044-03358 attached as Exhibit FB 2.
 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Civil Rights and Liberties dated December 6, 2004, Exhibit M2.
 Aff. of Storbakken dated December 3, 2004, Item 6.
 Aff. of Bibeau, Item 17 (Emphasis in original).
 See Decision & Order of October 22, 2004, Memorandum by the Honorable Judge Treuer in CV-04-113.
 See Aff. of Christopher Bedeau with police transcript attached.
 See Aff. of Delores Fineday attached.
 Aff. of Bedeau, Transcript p. 12.
 Second Aff. of Bibeau, Item 8.
 Id. Items 9 & 10.
 Id. Item 11.
 Id. Item 12.
 Id. Item 14.
 Id. Item 21.
 Id. Item 24.
 Id. Item 23.
 Quote from Ken Sanderson, American Government professor at Itasca Community College about 198X.
 Minn. Stat. 609.505.
 Monell at FN 50.
 See LLBO Code of Ethics, Section IV, Part B, et seq and related memos and original resolution 96-109, attached as Exhibit M2R 3.
 See Memorandum in Support of Complaint for Civil Rights and Liberties, Exhibit M4, LLRBC memo date July 16, 2002 and CONCURRENCE signed by Defendants Wilson, Losh and Robinson (emphasis in original).
 Complaint for Civil Rights and Liberties, Item 81.
 See Jones v. Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe, CV-01-33, Findings, Conclusions & Judgment by the Honorable Margaret Treuer, Chief Judge of Leech Lake Tribal Court, dated August 6, 2002.
 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Complaint at p. 2.
 Id. See Exhibits copy of letters attached to Plaintiffs Baird & Bibeau Affs. as Exhibits VB 1 and FB 4.
 Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037-8, 56 L.Ed.2d 611, 17 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 873, 16 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8345 (1978).
 Order of Dismissal, p. 10.
 Means et al v. Wilson et al, 522 f. 2d 833 (8th Cir. 1975).
 See Harrison v. Brooks, 519 F.2d 1358, 1359-60 (1st Cir. 1975).
 Shortbull Court directing see Duff v. Sherlock, 432 F.Supp. 423, 429 (E.D.Pa.1977).
 See Lessman v. McCormick, 591 F.2d 605, 608 (10th Cir. 1979) (no animus against anyone other than individual plaintiff-debtor); McNally v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 532 F.2d 69, 75 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855, 97 S.Ct. 150, 50 L.Ed.2d 131 (1976) (citing McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 526 F.2d 870, 878 (5th Cir. 1976), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1977)); Carchman v. Korman Corp., 456 F.Supp. 730, 734 (E.D.Pa.1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 898, 100 S.Ct. 205, 62 L.Ed.2d 133 (1979) ("there must be a discriminatory animus toward a class, not toward an individual qua individual").
 Section 8 of the Indian Civil Rights Act provides as follows: 25 U.S.C. s 1302. Constitutional rights. No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall- (8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of law.
 See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 72, 98 S.Ct. at 1684, 1689 (citations omitted) (J. White, dissenting).
 Second Aff. of Bibeau, Item 15.