Robert Goggleye, Veldon Baird, Frank Bibeau, Wallace Storbakken, Andrea Wade, Bruce Johnson, Deana McDaniel, Delina White, Richard Jones, Carrie Kolodji and Roxanne LaRose, et al.



Burton “Luke” Wilson, District 1
Representative, Lyman L. Losh,
District 2 Representative, Richard Robinson Jr., former District 3 Representative, George Goggleye,
Chairman, Donald “Mick” Finn,
District 3 Representative, individually,
and as representatives of the Leech Lake
Reservation Business Committee (LLRBC) a/k/a Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe (LLBO),

And Michael Garbow, John Wind, Rodney White and Sally Morrison,


Court File No. CV-04-122

TO:    Defendants Burton “Luke” Wilson, District 1 Representative, Lyman L. Losh, District 2 Representative, Richard Robinson Jr., former District 3 Representative, George Goggleye, Chairman, Donald “Mick” Finn, District 3 Representative, individually and as representatives of the Leech Lake Reservation Business Committee (LLRBC) a/k/a Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe (LLBO), and Michael Garbow, John Wind, Rodney White and Sally Morrison at 115 Sixth Street NW, Suite E, Cass Lake, Minnesota 56633.


            The Anishinabeg people of the Leech Lake Reservation have been waiting too long for the words and concepts of various authorities’ laws to deliver the protections, privileges and immunities guaranteed under the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe’s (MCT) Constitution, the U.S. Constitution, the Indian Civil Rights Act so that we may achieve true freedom, independence and democracy.  So that we all may pursue life, liberty and happiness free of tribal government interference, oppression and deprivation of civil rights and with the ultimate goal that tribal government will focus its resources for the benefit of the people.

Forty years ago during a presentation on American Indians and Civil Rights, Morris K. Udall quoted Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s talk on war on poverty noting that FDR said:

 We have come to a clear realization that true individual freedom cannot exist without economic security and independence. We have accepted, so to speak, a second Bill of Rights. Among these are:


1.    "The right to a useful and remunerative job...

2.    "The right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and recreation....

3.    "The right of every family to a decent home;

4.    "The right to adequate medical care and the            opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health;

5.    "The right to adequate protection from the economic fears of old age, sickness, accident and unemployment;

6.    "The right to a good education."


Udall went on to say “[a]ll of these rights we still hold to be self-evident. But many of them still beyond the grasp of most Indians as well as many other Americans.[1] 

Recognition of the need for protections for these rights and liberties, so that Anishinabeg of the MCT can be or become a free and democratic society are found in Article XIII – Rights of Members[2] and the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA).[3]  Essentially, all governmental entities, subordinate to the U.S. Constitution, are restrained from unconstitutional deprivations or violations of peoples’ inalienable civil rights. 

Here in 2004, Defendants are openly abusing governmental power to deprive, oppress, injure and harm people (Plaintiffs particularly) in their livelihood and person, completely outside the scope of any official or sovereign duty, responsibility or protective immunity.  Most importantly, because this is Indian country and not main street USA, the usual protections by law enforcement as well as other legal remedies, recourses and relief are perpetually elusive for the Anishinabe people.

There is an old saying “if you want peace, work for justice.”  FDR’s second bill of rights is a by-product of justice and will not become a reality for the Anishinabe people without justice.  Logically, stable/reliable  employment leads to reliable transportation, decent housing, healthy families, good education and strong communities.  In contrast, it has been said that the way to stay in power in the Third World is to keep the people poor, divided and ignorant.  Here on Leech Lake Reservation, Defendants tactics more closely resemble those of unaccountable, third world dictators, using employment and intimidation (termination) as carrot and stick conditioning to control people and government with a quasi-indentured servitude system of corruption. Corruption is

an act done with the intent to give some advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others.  The act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and rights of others. [4]  


This unchecked and unrestrained corrupt system of local reservation government employment practices has been allowed to continue primarily because of confusion about tribal sovereign immunity and ultimately because the people who are all too often the poor, lack the resources for independence and too often must rely on the Reservation for employment for daily survival.  Consequently, the Anishinabe people cannot afford to openly challenge the employer (bite the hand that feeds them), even if it is government and the people have been bestowed significant and fundamental, enumerated constitutional and civil rights.  Defendants have conspired to systematically deprive Plaintiffs (and others similarly situated) of their various protected civil rights and liberties, using tactics of fear and intimidation sometimes combine with police powers.  Defendants have taken additional actions in furtherance of their conspiracy by intentionally defaming Plaintiffs in publicly disseminated print[5], depriving other tribal members of constitutional and civil rights associated with candidacy[6] and voting[7] and openly and notoriously defying tribal court orders[8] and disrespecting the jurisdiction and decisions of the Tribal Court.[9]  Defendants have demonstrated a pattern of abuse for which the resulting harms and injuries must be corrected and/or compensated. 

For many tribal members living on this primarily rural reservation, tribal government is often the best paying and/or only source of employment.  Defendants have caused LLR government employment to mirror indentured servitude or cronyism which acts, are ultimately, wholly destructive to the people, families, culture, traditions and any hopes of future good government. The Anishinabe people of Leech Lake Reservation need and deserve the privileges, protections, guarantees, rights and liberties provided for by the supreme the law of the land enforced so that the Anishinabe people may help themselves without fear of unexpected, arbitrary and capricious, civil rights deprivations by tribal government and/or elected RBC members.  The Anishinabeg people of the Leech Lake Reservation will continue to suffer (be poor, divided and ignorant) and will be deprived of  the personal prosperity of stable employment and family lives, until meaningful justice takes firm hold on Leech Lake Reservation.

In support of their Complaint for Civil Rights and Liberties, Plaintiffs do hereby submit their Memorandum of Law as follows:


            Following the General Elections for the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe’s six reservations on June 8, 2004, a rogue faction of the Leech Lake Reservation Business Committee (LLRBC) comprised of the then three elected District Representatives, conspired with named Defendants and likely others to take control of governmental jobs and functions and to terminate employees perceived to be associated with recently resigned Chairman White and then Secretary-Treasurer LaRose or for working in support of the goals and/or projects of the Business Corporation, which included the Shingobee Marina & Casino/100 Homes Project.

            On or about June 9, 2004, after the results of the election were certified, the three LLRBC District Representatives met with then lame duck Chairman Peter D. White to negotiate a pay/severance package in exchange for his immediate resignation.  During that same timeframe, the three LLRBC District Representatives met with attorney Michael Garbow [Defendant herein] to seek an Emergency Ex Parte Order against the then seated Secretary-Treasurer, Arthur “Archie” LaRose.[10]  At the ex parte hearing, Defendant Wilson herein provided the only testimony making broad, unsubstantiated allegations of election tampering and vote buying by LaRose to justify the emergency need to takeover control of Accounting and finances.  Based solely on the testimony of a known, political rival at the ex parte hearing, the Honorable Judge Anita Fineday ordered that “Burton [‘]Luke[‘] Wilson, Rich Robinson, Jr. and Lyman Losh and their designees only shall be allowed access to these [Accounting] offices until a full hearing is held on June 22, 2004 at 9 am.”[11]  After receiving the Order on June 10, 2004, Defendant Wilson called the Tribal Police to request police “officers presence during removal” at the “Legal Department.”[12]

Defendant Wilson, aided by the presence of the Tribal Police and fresh Tribal Court Order served a termination memorandum from Defendant Representatives on then Tribal Attorney Frank Bibeau, demanding immediate removal.  Defendants Wilson and Assistant Police Chief John Wind did personally search attorney Bibeau’s personal effects and did seize and hold personal property, files and other valuables unlawfully and without warrant or order, using police power under color of law.  During the removal, other Defendants were called and came to spectate and ridicule at the public firing and removal at the Legal Department.  Others office visitors came and left abruptly appearing to be shocked and scared when walking in on the uniformed officers rummaging through Plaintiff’s boxes and personal belongings. 

That same day Plaintiff Baird also received a termination memorandum from the District Representatives and was removed with the aid of police.  Both Plaintiffs promptly requested an appeal hearing for the terminations writing that they were “not provided any due process under the LLBO Human Resource Policies and Procedures. . .”[13]  The next day, June 14, 2004, Defendant Garbow issued denial response letters to Plaintiffs Baird and Bibeau writing that the LLRBC “is conducting and internal investigation” and “as an at-will employer, the Leech Lake Tribal Council has the right to terminate your employment in accordance with the Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe Personnel Policies.  Therefore, the Tribal Council voted to terminate your employment by majority vote which means you have no appeal rights.” [14] 

On or about June 14, 2004, the three Defendant District Representatives called a Special Meeting, and selected Defendant Wilson to be an illegitimate “Acting Chairman”, apparently until Chairman-elect Goggleye was officially seated.  Additionally, Defendants promptly entered into employment contracts/agreements with Defendant Garbow as new Tribal Attorney and later transferred a Controller, Michael Ziemer, to replace Plaintiffs.  Then sitting Secretary-Treasurer raised his concerns at the Special Meeting and promptly wrote to MCT President Norman DesChampe about the violations of the governing bylaws by Defendants.[15]  MCT President responded that same day expressing concerns about the circumstances as “troubling because, as I understand Leech Lake’s Bylaws, the Secretary-Treasurer has specific duties with respect to financial and accounting records.”[16]  The terminations of Plaintiffs Baird and Bibeau intimidated other Plaintiffs who were allowed to resign to receive uncontested unemployment benefits[17] and avoid defamation. 

The following week, Defendants terminated the remaining Plaintiffs using a June 24, 2004 memorandum, commingling private employment data, which memorandum was later distributed publicly to other employees to further broadcast or defame Plaintiffs in the workplace, thereby increasing intimidation factor amongst remaining employees.  Other Plaintiffs were simply laid off without valid reasons, yet publicly defamed as part of the June 24th group ambush termination at the Business Corporation using Tribal Police in the parking lots to add to the spectacle.  Several Plaintiffs appealed their terminations, which were either denied outright in the opinion of the Tribal Attorney[18] or ignored[19] with no remedies allowed, thereby violating the LLBO’s human resource policies and procedures, ICRA and the constitutions.

On July 2, 2004, Chairman Goggleye and District Representative Finn were officially seated (both Defendants herein) and Defendant Robinson left office and he was later given other governmental employment.  Plaintiff Goggleye (uncle to Defendant Chairman Goggleye) did personally meet with the new LLRBC officials in an effort to correct and resolve the wrongful terminations, unsuccessfully.[20]  In fact, Defendants began a broader defamation campaign against Plaintiffs, in the printed news media, in the workplace and other legal forums.  Over the summer Defendants were involved a variety of legal actions in Tribal Court where they were challenged for their various deprivations of civil rights to members, reported election tampering, publicly disparaging the Tribal Court system, personnel and resulting decisions and openly defying valid and lawful orders of the Tribal Court.  

Plaintiffs believe that they were targeted by Defendants in a conspiracy to deprive Plaintiffs civil rights as part of an overall effort to send a message of fear across Leech Lake Reservation that anyone perceived as supporting, voting for or other perceived association with former Chairman White and/or then Secretary-Treasurer LaRose, with the ultimate goal being to chill, stifle and oppress the Anishinabe peoples’ political freedoms, candidates and rights of voting through intimidation.  Defendants have conspired to prevent the actual provision of democracy for the Anishinabe people and the securing to all persons under the jurisdiction of Leech Lake Reservation, equal protection of the laws.  Defendants have wrongfully terminated and intentionally defamed Plaintiffs and the totality of their extreme and outrageous actions has resulted in widespread intentional infliction of emotional distress to Plaintiffs’ families and livelihoods.


Plaintiffs were all long-term, non-probationary employees who were not currently involved in a progressive discipline process with their respective supervisors when Defendants acted to terminate and deprive them of their jobs. Plaintiffs have brought this legal action in part to correct and compensate for past violations of Plaintiffs’ individual civil rights, to restrain elected tribal officials and their government subdivisions/agents from future unconstitutional employment practices and to establish employment case law that will protect the Anishinabe peoples’ civil rights and liberties. 

Defendants and/or LLRBC tribal government have been named in a variety of legal filings for various, on-going civil rights violations and other matters for sometime.[21]   In many ways all of these cases needed to occur so that the totality of the circumstances may viewed together and in light of each other to see all of Defendants’ various acts and omissions in furtherance of their overall conspiracy to deprive civil rights and voting rights, both of which are really at the core of democracy and human rights.  This case calls into question whether the various civil rights and liberties as expressly provided to the Anishinabe people and/or necessary to a democratic government with sovereign considerations will continue to be elusive, or worse, be allowed to continuously be trampled upon by tribal government.  An instructive case for many of the legal issues involved in this instant matter is Means v. Wilson[22] from a time 30 years ago when the Indian civil rights and voting rights were being fiercely fought for and over by the Olgala people.  It is apparent that political and economic circumstances for reservation Indians have not changed much in the absence of meaningful and enforceable ICRA restraints or justice against tribal government’s civil rights violations.  Without enforcement of laws meant to protect citizens from government’s abuses of the express and enumerated “protected or guaranteed” civil rights and liberties, the Anishinabe people of LLR  will never progress to the second bill of rights contemplated by FDR, which will enable and facilitate actual democratic government for and by the people.  It is now over thirty years since Wounded Knee and the LLR Defendants’ pattern and string of ultra vires acts and omissions do not forecast or signal any willingness to exercise self-restraint from acts in furtherance to deprive civil rights of Plaintiffs and others similarly situated.


Sovereign Immunity is a judicial doctrine which precludes bringing suit against the government without its consent.[23]  Indian tribes are quasi-sovereign.

1.         Tribal Sovereign Immunity

It is well-established that Indian tribes have immunity to suit in federal court absent congressional abrogation or a clear waiver by the tribe.[24]   The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized and upheld sovereign immunity for Indian tribes.[25]  Such immunity extends to tribal agencies and economic enterprises[26] and to tribal officials performing acts within the scope of their authority.[27]  As a federally recognized tribe and individuals acting within the scope of their tribal authority, the Tribal defendants undisputably generally enjoy the protections of sovereign immunity.[28] Tribal sovereign immunity is not absolute, however, and may be waived by Congress or by an express, unequivocal waiver by the tribe itself.[29]   In Means, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals discusses Congress’ ICRA and did

agree with the district court's conclusion that 25 U.S.C. s 1302[30] provides rights only against the tribe and governmental subdivisions thereof, and not against tribe members acting in their individual capacities.[31] The statute provides that: "No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall . . ." engage in the prohibited conduct. 25 U.S.C. s 1302. "Indian tribe" and "powers of self-government" are defined in 25 U.S.C. s 1301(1) and (2).[32] When sections 1301 and 1302 are read together it is plain that only actions of the tribe and tribal bodies are constrained.


The Leech Lake Tribal Court’s recent sovereign immunity analysis noted that the sovereign immunity from

suits against the Band and every Tribal Council member or tribal official with respect to any action taken in the an official capacity or in the exercise of the official powers of any such office, in any court, . . . is hereby affirmed.[33]  The Judicial Code further provides that “the sovereign immunity of the Band and any elected tribal council member or tribal official with respect to any action taken in an official capacity, or in the exercise of the official powers of any such office, in any action filed in the Tribal Court with respect thereto, may only be waived by formal resolution of the RTC.”[34]


Leech Lake case laws shows that the Tribal Court has previously noted that “[s]everal tribal courts have held that tribal officials are not immune from suits for injunctive relief alleging a violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act.[35]  In LaRose, the Court went on add that “[a]nother reason why this Court feels that sovereign immunity should not bare the instant dispute . . . is that the Plaintiff has raised a claim under the MCT Constitution and the Indian Civil Rights Act.”[36] 

Here, Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief with regard to their deprivations of various civil rights and the property interests in their tribal government employment which elected-Defendants terminated.  Therefore, the ICRA provides rights and remedies against the LLBO in Tribal Court where there are allegations that tribal government engaged in prohibited conduct.

2.            Official Capacity Claims

            Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ have conspired to deprive them of various civil rights including due process and equal protection.  Defendants Wilson, Losh and Robinson previously threatened “a waiver of Sovereign Immunity to allow civil and monetary action against [RBC members]” for “attempts to fire any employee because they do not agree with [RBC members] on issues.” The Defendants acknowledged the “need to protect the rights of our employees.”[37]

As argued previously, sovereign immunity shields a tribe from civil suit unless Congress has specifically abrogated the tribe's immunity or the tribe has expressly waived its immunity.[38]   Courts have further held that tribal sovereign immunity “also extends to tribal officials when acting in their official capacity and within their scope of authority.”[39] 

When the termination memorandums[40] of June 10, 2004 were served on Plaintiffs Baird and Bibeau, the three elected District Representatives of the LLRBC were acting directly[41] instead of Plaintiffs supervisors as provided in the LLBO Human Resource Policies and Procedures.  Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants conspired to terminate Plaintiffs, deprive them of their civil rights and defamed them as part of Defendants’ fear and intimation efforts to otherwise harm/injure Plaintiffs (and others similarly situated) as part of Defendants’ tactics to unlawfully takeover the LLRBC finances and operations.  The question then is whether the actions of the LLRBC members who conspired to commit a variety of unlawful acts against Plaintiffs, can be considered official actions protected by the sovereign immunity defense. 

The LLBO’s Human Resources (HR) Policies and Procedures provide for employee discipline, termination and an appeal process.  Progressive discipline is management’s tool whereby a supervisor gives notice to the subordinate employee of undesirable performance and uses coaching, remedial training or other progressive discipline.  During the 2004 Removal hearings[42] for Secretary-Treasurer LaRose, Defendants herein re-served a memorandum from former Chairman Eli Hunt entitled FOR IMMEDIATE DISTRIBUTION TO ALL LLBO EMPLOYEES stating

[i]n addition, please keep in mind that an individual [LLRBC] member has neither the authority to change policy or procedure nor the authority to hire, fire, promote, or transfer employees.  Any amendment or revision to existing policies and procedures can only be changed by majority vote of the [LLRBC] at a special or regular meeting.[43]


Because the memorandum’s concurrence is signed by Defendants Losh, Wilson and Robinson, this suggests that Defendants knew or understood their restrained limits as elected officials with regard to their personal actions towards employees. Certainly, Defendants knew or should have known they were violating the LLBO Human Resource Policies and Procedures and thus were acting outside the scope of their authority when they conspired and acted to terminate and intimidate Plaintiffs in June 2004.

            In fact, the termination memorandum of June 24, 2004 to Plaintiffs is signed by “Acting Chairman” Burton “Luke” Wilson, along with Defendants Losh and Robinson.

On June 15, 2004, Secretary-Treasurer LaRose wrote to Norman DesChampe, MCT (Minnesota Chippewa Tribe) President expressing his concerns about the three, elected Defendants “Appointing Burton “Luke” Wilson Acting Chairman” in violation of the MCT Constitution and governing bylaws for LLR, known as Ordinance No. 1.    Secretary-Treasurer LaRose’s specific concerns (emphasis in original) were that Ord. No. 1[44] expressly provides only for a

Vice-Chairman, selected by mutual agreement (emphasis added) from the Reservation Business Committee present, shall preside at meeting for which he is selected.  The Vice-Chairman so selected shall assume no other duties or powers (emphasis added.) of the Chairman.[45] 

A review of LLR Ord. No. 1 shows that it is void of express duties for the district representatives and specifically precludes RBC members’ usurpation of the elected Chairman’s duties or powers.  In this case, Defendants did not have the legal power to create their own rogue RBC.  Therefore, Defendants have conspired and acted outside the express governing law which grants their powers, for the purposes of unlawfully depriving Plaintiffs’ civil rights.  Consequently, Defendant’s actions cannot be construed as official or representative capacity claims and are not protected by extension of the Tribe's sovereign immunity.

3.            Personal Capacity Claims

            Plaintiffs allege that Defendants conspired to deprive Plaintiffs of their due process and equal protection rights shrouded in defamatory allegations revealing the invidious animus, bias and/or vendetta on the part of Defendants.  Generally, a tribal official lacks the protection of sovereign immunity if he acts completely outside the scope of his delegated authority.[46]   However, an act completely outside an individual's scope of authority is to be distinguished from a situation where an employee acting as an agent of an employer commits an act that is essentially a mistake of fact or law.[47]   Therefore

[a] simple mistake of fact or law does not necessarily mean that an officer of the government has exceeded the scope of his authority.   Official action is still action of the sovereign, even if it is wrong, if it do[es] not conflict with the terms of [the officer's] valid statutory authority . . . .[48]  

In contrast, "[u]ltra vires claims rest on the official's lack of delegated power.[49]  The question is whether the claims against Defendants can be predicated upon actions they took pursuant to their delegated authorities as LLRBC members.

Here, Defendants conspired to take actions through Defendant LLRBC members to terminate and defame Plaintiffs to cause harm/injury to person, property and livelihood and send a message of fear to other LLBO employees. Defendants conspired to target this group of Plaintiffs because of Defendants’ invidious animus, bias and/or vendetta against Plaintiffs (and other similarly situated) for perceived association with former Chairman White and former Secretary-Treasurer LaRose (the invidious animus lightening rods).  Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants over all goal was to secure their control of tribal government finances and resources by any means possible which included the following acts in furtherance against Plaintiffs:

1.                    obtaining an Emergency Ex Parte Order to take control over Accounting (finances) by making unsubstantiated allegations of election fraud and vote buying against the then seated Secretary-Treasurer LaRose, without ever providing any actual witnesses alleging payment or similar affidavits, or testimony other than Defendant Wilson.

2.                    using the Tribal Police and/or Emergency Ex Parte Order to ambush-terminate Plaintiffs in a most public and defamatory manner to create fear and intimidation for employees who may be perceived as supporting or voting for White/LaRose.

3.                    using the Tribal Police and/or Emergency Ex Parte Order to conduct an unlawful search and seizures by Defendants.

4.                     terminating Business Corporation Plaintiffs using Security in the workplace and Tribal Police in the parking lot adjacent to the primary LLRBC administration building to attract attention in an openly malicious and defamatory manner so as to maximize the element of fear towards other employees who might be perceived as supporters or voters for White/LaRose.

5.                    by repeatedly denying terminated Plaintiffs requests for appeal hearings or other due process for their wrongful terminations.

6.                    by repeatedly broadcasting false and defamatory statements to the Minnesota Department of Employee and Economic Development (Mn/DEED) Unemployment Insurance (UI) in an attempt to wrongfully deny benefits to financially harm Plaintiffs and cause further fear and intimidation among employees.

Defendants’ related acts in furtherance

After new LLRBC members Chairman Goggleye and Dist. 3. Rep. Finn, Defendants herein, were officially seated July 2, 2004, Secretary-Treasurer LaRose himself became Defendants’ next, main target for civil rights deprivation and Defendants did ultimately remove LaRose from his elected office.[50]  These efforts publicly began in December 2002 when Petitioners presented the Petition for Removal/Recall of LaRose.  In response, LaRose sought Tribal Court relief[51] against Defendants Wilson, Losh and Robinson and members of the Petition Validation Committee, individually and officially.  All claims were dismissed in LaRose’s “complaint except the claim asserting that the recall petition is insufficient under Article X, Section 3.”[52]  Proving the sufficiency of the Petition to remove an elected politician should have been the role and responsibility of Defendants.  However, elected-Defendants Wilson, Losh and Robinson took actions in January 2003 to use tribal funds, which often come from gaming revenues, to contract with a private attorney[53] to carry out the political goals of removing their political adversary LaRose.  Prior to the June 8, 2004 MCT reservation General Elections, Defendants did conspire with a second private attorney[54] to help gain control of LLBO governmental finances and operations, terminate employees and ultimately remove LaRose.

Defendants announced via press Release that another Removal hearing would be scheduled July 30, 2004 for LaRose.[55]  The Tribal Court later held that the manner in which the Removal hearing was conducted by Defendants violated LaRose’s constitutional due process rights because LaRose was not served Notice of Charges until after the Removal hearing had begun.  The Tribal Court specifically noted that “Attorney Garbow admitted during the teleconference . . . that to the best of his knowledge this allegation was true.”[56]  The Court then held that “failure to provide those documents and papers to LaRose in advance of the hearing was a violation of the due process standards applicable to deprivation of a significant and important property interest such as removal from an elected office.”[57]

Meanwhile, Defendants had also drafted and adopted an unconstitutional, ex post facto suspect criteria[58] for candidacy for the Secretary-Treasurer position to unlawfully prevent LaRose from being a candidate for the office, for which Defendants had thought they effected his removal.  Accordingly, the Court held that

LaRose was denied his right of fundamental due process at the removal hearing . . . and such hearing shall be reopened to permit . . . a meaningful defense to the charges . . . and . . . the scheduled special election shall be put on hold until such time as the hearing is reopened . . . [and] this Court declares that the RBC erred in denying Arthur LaRose certification as a candidate.[59]

Unfortunately, Defendants were not accepting of the Tribal Court’s Order and Chairman Goggleye immediately issued a letter of opposition to Tribal Court Chief Judge Treuer telling the Judge that the LLRBC’s position is “that the Leech Lake Tribal Court does not have the subject matter jurisdiction” regarding the manner in which Defendants Removed LaRose and Defendants “ability to deny certification for a potential candidate.”  The Chairman concluded his letter stating that the LLRBC “will not provide Archie LaRose with another hearing nor is the [LLRBC] going to certify Archie LaRose [as a candidate].”[60] The basic content of the Chairman’s August 30th letter, on behalf of Defendants defying the Tribal Court Order dated August 29, 2004, was also distributed as a press release[61] to various, local news media who then reported that “the Leech Lake Tribal Council has refused to abide by the court order, taking the stand that the tribal court ruling is unconstitutional.”[62]

The Defendants’ legal analysis is revealed in a September 1, 2004 letter to MCT President Norman DesChampe whereby Defendant Goggleye writes that

I have reviewed the [LLBO] Judicial Code with . . . Tribal Attorney, Mike Garbow . . . and we have determined that there in no [LLBO] Judicial Code or Tribal Ordinance that gives the . . . Tribal Court the authority . . . [because] it is clear that the Leech Lake Tribal Court has no authority that has been given to them via Leech Lake Tribal Ordinance or Resolution that would give them the authority to overrule a Leech Lake Tribal Council decision . . .”[63] (Emphasis added).

Defendants continued to ignore the Tribal Court Order until Defendants Wilson and Finn herein were publicly reported as tampering with the Election Board members in a Tribal Court hearing[64] on September 24, 2004.  That matter was filed because Defendants publicly heralded the firing of the Election Board Plaintiffs in an effort to defame and cast blame to cover for Defendants actions. The Tribal Court remarked that

Plaintiffs were not given prior notice of their removal and were removed from their offices by police escort.  Additionally, it appears that in response to a call from Sally Morrison, Interim Executive Director, a reporter from the Bemidji Pioneer was present to photograph Plaintiffs being removed from their offices.[65]

The Jackson Memorandum also noted testimony “that one of the candidates had a list of voters which other candidates did not have” and that Defendant “Candidate Burton [‘]Luke[‘] Wilson had improperly contacted election board members by telephone at their homes.[66]  Defendant Wilson had resigned his Dist. Rep. position to run for Secretary-Treasurer in the Special Election.[67] 

This brief synopsis of Defendants’ related conspiratorial acts to violate LaRose’s constitutional and civil rights and related election board/voting tampering is provided to show the open and notorious, continuous pattern of conduct which still survives, as shown in a confusing press release where the LLRBC suggested that  THEY  were protecting the Tribal Court, yet the LLRBC re-affirmed that “it was and still is the Tribal Council’s position that the Leech Lake Tribal Court did not have the constitutional authority to force the Leech Lake Tribal Council to certify an individual for candidacy” and that the Special Election “will be immediately terminated until final decision regarding removal.”[68]  Ultimately, the LLRBC cancelled the Special Elections for Secretary-Treasurer and Dist. 1 Rep., which enabled co-Defendant Wilson to withdraw his irrevocable resignation and thus keep Defendants’ political voting block, majority on the LLRBC intact.


Defendants conspired to deny, deprive, interfere and injure Plaintiffs in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1985(3) which provides that

if two or more persons . . . conspire . . . for the purposes depriving any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws, or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any [dependant sovereign government] from giving or securing to all persons within [such sovereign government’s jurisdiction] the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by . . . intimidation . . . any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person [for public office] . . . or injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy [and that] any act in furtherance . . . whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having or exercising any right or privilege of a citizen . . ., the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more if the conspirators.


The Griffin Court

emphasized that in order to show a deprivation of equal protection or equal privileges and immunities which may be redressed under 42 U.S.C. s 1985(3), it must be shown that the conspirators were motivated by an invidiously discriminatory animus toward a racial group or perhaps another type of class.[69] In interpreting this class-based discrimination test the Fifth Circuit has said:


There need not necessarily be an organizational structure of adherents, but there must exist an identifiable body with which the particular plaintiff associated himself by some affirmative act. It need not be an oath of fealty; it need not be an initiation rite; but at least it must have an intellectual nexus which has somehow been communicated to, among and by the members of the group.[70]


The Means Court found this reasoning valid and determined that

the group of plaintiffs in this case, by their affirmative acts of supporting plaintiff Means and the American Indian Movement and attempting to oust Wilson as their Council President, were a class against whom, according to the allegations of their complaint, the defendants discriminated because of their class membership.[71] This brings their complaint within the ambit of 42 U.S.C. s 1985(3).[72]


The Griffin Court also recognized that even a mistaken belief of association/support by Defendants satisfies the §1985(3) noting that those conspirators

were 'acting under a mistaken belief that R. G. Grady was a worker for Civil Rights for Negroes.' These allegations clearly support the requisite animus to deprive the petitioners of the equal enjoyment of legal rights because of their race. The claims of detention, threats, and battery amply satisfy the requirement of acts done in furtherance of the conspiracy. Finally, the petitioners--whether or not the nonparty Grady was the main or only target of the conspiracy--allege personal injury resulting from those acts. The complaint, then, states a cause of action under s 1985(3). Indeed, the conduct here alleged lies so close to the core of the coverage intended by Congress that it is hard to conceive of wholly private conduct that would come within the statute if this does not.[73]


In Means, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that

[t]he right to vote is fundamental to representative government.  As a right of national citizenship, it is a source of constitutional power, and Congress has the power to guarantee that right by statute.[74]  We have previously held that Congress has guaranteed the right to vote in tribal elections against interference from Indian tribes by enactment of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. s 1301 Et seq.[75]  These cases established that where Indian tribes have adopted Anglo-Saxon democratic processes for selection of tribal representatives, equal protection concepts applicable to the tribes by virtue of the Indian Civil Rights Act required adherence to the one man one vote principle as a necessary concomitant of the election process.[76]  Today we hold that 42 U.S.C. s 1985(3) protects the right to vote in tribal elections against interference from private conspiracies as well.


Here, Defendants have taken several actions in furtherance of their conspiracy to wrongfully terminate Plaintiffs in violation of their civil rights.  Whether Plaintiffs were actually supporting or voting for White/LaRose does not matter as long as Defendants believed Plaintiffs were part of that target group and that Defendants subsequently acted to violate their civil rights and Plaintiffs “allege personal injury resulting from those acts.”[77]

Violations of §1985 by elected tribal government members against an opposing political group is not protected by sovereign immunity.  The Means Court pointed out that

[i]n considering the Means faction's section 1985(3) claim, the district court first held that that section did not affect the Oglala Sioux Tribe's historic immunity from suit. With this we agree.[78] But the district court erred in concluding that this same reasoning applied to suits against individual Indians. Tribal immunity is based on the sovereignty of the tribe.[79] Therefore we must look further than the tribal immunity doctrine to determine whether there is jurisdiction over individual defendants under 42 U.S.C. s 1985(3) and 28 U.S.C. s 1343(4).


The Means Court went on to use the Griffin[80]  analysis to determine whether there is jurisdiction over individual defendants under 42 U.S.C. s 1985(3) noting that

the Court held that 42 U.S.C. s 1985(3) provided a cause of action against private conspiracies, i. e. those not involving state action, to deprive citizens of equal protection of the law or of equal privileges and immunities. In each section 1985 case it must be determined whether there is a constitutional source of congressional power to reach the private conspiracy alleged in the complaint.[81] In Griffin the Supreme Court identified two such sources of congressional power; the thirteenth amendment and the right of interstate travel.[82] This latter right was characterized as one of the rights of national citizenship which Congress has the power to protect by appropriate legislation.[83]


In Griffin the Supreme Court found that Congress has the power to protect the various rights of national citizenship, many of which are enumerated in the Bill of Rights or Congress’ ICRA which directly provided those rights of national citizenship, both of which pass to tribal members under the MCT Const. Art. XIII - Rights of Members.

These actions in furtherance of the conspiracy by Defendants are outside the scope of delegated authority. Defendants wrongly asserted that the MCT Constitution “gives the Leech Lake Tribal Council aka Reservation Business Committee (by a majority vote) the ability to hire and fire employees for the Reservation as they deem appropriate.”[84]  The Chairman’s response was because then seated Secretary-Treasurer LaRose “continually refers to certain employees as illegal hires.”[85]  These certain employees are the cronies and co-conspirators who promptly gained the LLBO tribal employment immediately following the wrongful termination of Plaintiffs.  The hiring process is not at issue, but instead how the vacancies occurred in violation of existing LLBO HR Policies and Procedures and other existing ordinances, MCT Const., US Const. and the ICRA.  Ironically, Defendant Finn seemed to understand restrain on government in his writings in the same Native American Press/Ojibwe News (NAP/ON) paper, page and day that “one of the main reasons a Constitution is written is to protect the rights and assets of the people that the government is meant to serve.”[86] 

To create the jobs openings or vacancies, Defendants conspired to wrongfully terminate Plaintiffs and to deprive the protected property and civil rights associated with governmental employment.  Therefore, Defendants’ acts are ultra vires and personal capacity claims against the individuals must stand and proceed as there is a per se divestiture of sovereign immunity when established ordinances, policies, statutes, regulations and constitutions are violated when officials and agents are pursuing unlawful, unauthorized activities.


The Defendants have repeatedly shown they will handle governmental matters personally and politically retaliate personally, using their elected and governmental positions to terminate or blackball people and/or give jobs to Defendants’ cronies (friends and supporters), commonly referred to as political patronage.  Patronage is “the practice of a public official in making appointments to public (non-civil service) offices” such as when a new governor is elected, the governor appoints commissioners to his cabinet.[87]  Civil service “generally means employment in federal, state city and town government with such positions filled on merit as a result of competitive examinations.  Such employment carries with it certain statutory rights to job security, advancement, benefits, etc.”[88] which are similarly spelled out and provided for in the LLBO Human Resource Policies and Procedures Section 200 et seq.

The U.S. Civil Service Act “was designed to establish a merit system under which appointments to Federal jobs are made on the basis of fitness . . . rather than personal preference or political considerations.”[89]  The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 . . . feature[d] . . . the establishment of an independent and equitable appeals process, protections against abuses of the merit system” and “similar commissions exist in most states covering state and local public employment.”[90]

The Anishinabe people of the Leech Lake Reservation have a right to expect their tribal government to follow its own established policies and ordinances, as well as respect the protections and guarantees of the MCT Const., U.S. Const. and ICRA as they relate to the Anishinabe people and band employees.  Instead, Defendants have conspired to deprive Plaintiffs’ of their rights in direct violation of established LLBO employment rights and procedures.  Defendants wrongly declare themselves to be an “at will” employer.[91]  In Jones, the Court took particular note of the LLBO Human Resources (HR) policies pointing out that

[t]he subject policy establishes specific procedures and conditions to be followed prior to termination. It includes progressive discipline measures and provides a grievance procedure.  The grievance procedure includes an appeal of termination to an appeals committee.  The decision of the appeals committee is final under 300.7(c).  The Band’s personnel policy provides at Part 100.3: Employment at will: [‘]Just as an employee of the LL Band of Ojibwe is free to end their employment and any point in time, the LL band of Ojibwe Administrative staff reserves the rights to terminate an employee’s employment in accordance with these policies.” (Emphasis in original).[92]


The same emphasized words appear in Defendant Garbow’s letter in response to Plaintiffs’ request for appeals of terminations.[93]  However, Defendants’ actions are not in accordance with the established LLBO HR policies, which HR policies very much mirror the constitutional due process provisions of the ICRA.

            The Tribal Court has previously held that “the right to hold [employment] is a property right that cannot be taken without due process of law.”[94] Further noting that the “process due . . . includes, at a minimum . . . oral or written notice, an explanation of the . . . evidence, and an opportunity for [the employee] to present [their] side of the story.”[95]  Here, Defendants knew or should have known about the need to provide some basic due process and what constitutes some of the minimum requirements since Defendants were officially placed on notice in January 2003, as many Defendants herein were a party or participant in various aspects of the removal attempts associated with LaRose v. Wilson[96] from December 2002 to September 2004.  Here the LLRBC Defendants have intentionally deprived Plaintiffs of the various employment rights associated with governmental employment, with the aid of legal counsel named as a Defendant herein.

            In Ross, another employment case, the Tribal Court determined that the termination methods used did not comply with the specific written due process provisions.[97]  Further, in Ross the Tribal Court provided for paid leave pending strict compliance with the Tribal College Charter.[98]  Here, Plaintiffs have not been terminated in compliance with the established LLBO HR policies and procedures, in violation of LLBO laws, MCT and US Constitutional provisions and applicable federal laws.

Defendants have made a series of unsubstantiated allegations and announced investigations by various entities in what only appears to be a defamation smoke screen for wrongful terminations.  Plaintiffs deserve equal protections and equal treatment under the law.  Because of the alleged circumstances of Defendants’ intimidation surrounding employment, the employment determinations[99] made by the Minnesota Department of the Employment and Economic Development (Mn/DEED) should substitute and serve as the neutral appeal process.   In each case, Defendants had an opportunity to make their case, present evidence and argue for good cause termination.  When those efforts failed, Defendants were also granted appeal hearings by Mn/DEED.  In each Unemployment benefits case appealed by Defendants herein, Mn/DEED determined that there was not good cause attributable to the employee saying that Claimants were “discharged for reasons other than misconduct.”[100]  Therefore, Plaintiffs deserve to be rightfully re-instated to their original positions, with full back-pay like in Ross.

Whistle Blowing protections from wrongful termination are likely the most important legal tools for protecting the interests of the tribal members.  Tribal employees are the very citizens who routinely encounter tribal government 40 hours/week. Consequently, their constitutional protections regarding governmental employment relationships (property right) must be provided a safe harbor so that whistle blowers will come forward early as they often have the best opportunity to warn of wrongdoing.  Unfortunately, all too often employees who witness/discover wrongdoing are intimidated by the fear of termination of employment or they may become co-opted to receive additional benefits/services for themselves or their family.  If whistle blowers or other non-probationary employees are terminated without any protections, the Anishinabe people on the LL reservation lose again and most likely Defendants will assign another crony to be the replacement to plug the information leak or concerns of wrongdoing.


            Defendants have recklessly and with malicious intent, repeatedly engaged in defamatory conduct against Plaintiffs in legal forums, local news media and LLBO workplaces, most likely using LLBO financial resources as some defamation was openly distributed to LLBO employees in their workplaces, via interoffice mail.[101]   Minnesota law provides that a “defamatory matter is anything which exposes a person or a group, class or association to hatred, contempt, ridicule, degradation or disgrace in society, or injury to business or occupation.”[102] The law describes acts constituting defamation as “whomever with knowledge of its defamatory character orally, in writing or by any other means, communicates any defamatory matter to a third person without the consent of the person defamed is . . . defamation.”[103]  In Minnesota

            To prove a defamation claim, a plaintiff must establish that the alleged statements were made, that they were communicated to someone other than herself, that they were false, and that, as a result, her reputation was harmed.[104] A plaintiff must prove that the defendant published the statements.[105]


Here, Defendants have issued a series of printed publications defaming various Plaintiffs herein.  The June 24, 2004, group ambush, Termination Memorandum intentionally commingled employees’ private data with general allegations towards Plaintiffs that “an investigation of the Business Corporation is now taking place.  There are more than enough violations for cause including insubordination, misappropriation of Tribal funds . . . More evidence will surface in civil matters.”[106]  However, Defendants failed to convince Mn/DEED, the neutral, outside Minnesota agency responsible for Unemployment Benefits that there was good cause (or employee misconduct) for the terminations of  the employees/Plaintiffs herein.  A more recent example of defamation by Defendant Wilson states “All the people of Leech Lake have to suffer because of the reckless spending and the Legal advice Frank Bebeau did for the Business Corporation.”[107] The month before Defendant Wilson issued A response to Wagosh and What’s up[108] remarking that “Pea Brain former LLBO Attorney Frank Bebeau didn’t know that. His signature was on all the illegal land purchase contracts with Mike Johnson, Bob Goggleye and Gerald White.”[109]  Defendants have repeatedly announced various Plaintiffs are “under investigation” without ever interviewing Plaintiffs.  Because so many false and defamatory statements have been issued by various Defendants, printed and distributed with the malicious intent to injure/harm the reputation of Plaintiffs in their person and livelihood, Defendants must be held liable for those damages.


Defendants’ acts of defamation were part of an overall conspiracy to retaliate against Plaintiffs and subsequently deprive Plaintiffs of their civil rights with a goal to financially harm Plaintiffs and others similarly situated.  Defendants then self-dealt employment to themselves and cronies.  LLBO employees, family members or others fear who next may be perceived as having supported or voted for White/LaRose because Defendants will focus their invidious animus towards them and cause their loss of employment or other benefits.  Employment is important for stable families and communities and the extreme, publicly defamatory methods used by LLRBC elected officials to terminate and continue to defame Plaintiffs destabilizes families and creates fear and hardship to extended family members.  The intentional infliction of loss of income (poverty), public defamation in newspapers and workplace memos coupled with unrestrained deprivation of constitutional and civil rights by LLRBC Defendants have intentionally, recklessly and maliciously caused an extremely profound and distressing impact on Plaintiffs’ spouses, children, extended family, friends and their reputation and place in the community.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) has four elements and in Minnesota

in order to prevail on an intentional infliction claim, four elements must exist: (1) the conduct must be extreme and outrageous; (2) the conduct must be intentional or reckless; (3) it must cause emotional distress; and (4) the distress must be severe.[110]


All four elements have been an on-going part of Plaintiffs’ families’ lives for months.

“Extreme and outrageous conduct [is] only where [the] behavior is so atrocious that it passes the bounds of decency and is utterly intolerable to the civilized community.”[111]  “It is well recognized that an employer's conduct may provide a
sufficient basis for an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.”[112]  Here, the Defendants’ actions are specifically directed at the Plaintiffs personally rather than arising from the employment relationship. 

The Laurie’s article about the Employment Law Handbook provides some unique insight to the circumstances present in this matter as

[s]ome courts have found that the authoritative position of employers entitles employees to greater protection from emotional distress.[113] In Glass, although the court recognized that abuse of a position of authority may give rise to an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the court held that Minnesota law does not hold employers to a higher standard merely because of their fiduciary relationship.[114] Because no Minnesota appellate court has directly addressed this question despite numerous opportunities to do so, it is doubtful that Minnesota courts will apply such a heightened scrutiny in the employment context.

Here however, Defendants are elected, governmental officials with a higher duty owed to the Anishinabe people than that of an ordinary employer.  Elected Defendants herein swear an oath of office to

[s]upport, honor and respect the Constitution of the United States and the Revised Constitution and Bylaws of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe and will faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of my office to the best of my judgement and ability . . .[115]

Defendants herein are not just an employer but a government, legally constrained by two constitutions, LLBO laws, ordinances and policies, and federal laws.  Therefore, Defendants owe a much higher standard of conduct to the Anishinabe people of LLR, and especially to government employees.

            Plaintiffs herein have already shown sufficiently outrageous conduct by Defendants by thorough allegations in the Complaint and this Memorandum chronicling the Defendants’ continuing series of  acts that might be insufficient when considered alone, but taken as a whole are deemed sufficient when considered cumulatively.[116] In fact, in the big picture for the Anishinabe people on LLR, several other related tribal court cases involving Defendants herein must also be considered to fully appreciate the widespread civil rights abuses, terminations, defamations, reports of voting rights and election board tampering and/or tainting.[117]

An employer's inaction, as well as action, may provide a basis for an intentional infliction claim. For instance, where an employer fails to properly control the known, sexually harassing behavior of an employee, the employer's conduct may be deemed sufficiently outrageous.[118]  Here, after the newly elected Defendants were officially seated on July 2, 2004, they too were aware of, or had participated in, the prior bad acts by government officials and continued to allow and use the same unconstitutional actions against others similarly situated.  Defendants knew or should have known to follow the established rules, laws, policies etc based on prior self-initiated memorandums and their duties and responsibilities as elected government officials.[119]

Defendants’ conduct, because it is part of a conspiracy or part of a common scheme is necessarily intentional.  Consequently, Defendants acted in a reckless, shot-gun scatter blast manner with the expectation that financial and emotional distress would likely result. “Conduct that is considered extreme and outrageous will almost surely have been done either intentionally or recklessly.”[120]  Here, the terminations, defamations, attempts to wrongly deny Unemployment Benefits and hardships are focused at Plaintiffs, to disrupt and destabilize the personal lives which ultimately means Plaintiffs’ people, families and children suffer.[121]

The causation requirement is rather straightforward: an employer is liable only for that emotional distress that results from its own conduct.  Here, repeated allegations in the Complaint and documents attached as exhibits, demonstrate that Defendants as elected officials continue to show a pattern of acts to systematically cause personal, financial, emotional distress in Plaintiffs’ lives by the wrongful terminations, defamation and on-going deprivations of civil rights of others.

The Emp. Law Hdbk. article provides that the fourth element is met only where “the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable [person] could be expected to endure it.”[122]  Further, a plaintiffs allegations must be specific. Mere allegations of mental, emotional, and physical distress are insufficient to withstand summary judgment.[123] Although plaintiffs must prove that they suffered severe distress, courts have upheld claims based on an almost-infinite variety of symptoms.[124]    As such, courts tend to focus less upon the actual type of distress claimed and more upon whether the plaintiff can produce objective evidence that the distress was severe. In undertaking this analysis, courts will consider the intensity and duration of the distress.[125]
            The history of all of Indian country could be described as an on-going series of inflicted distresses with the treaties, being placed on reservations and followed by attempts to assimilate Indians or terminate tribes.  For decades, many Anishinabe and other Indian people have struggled to have their tribal governments recognize government’s legal limitations and that democracies only “derive their just powers from the consent of the governed.”[126]  The intentional infliction of emotional distress spills over in many un-quantifiable ways into family members lives.  For some the loss of employment creates a downward-spiral, financial domino affect where loans are defaulted, automobiles lost, utility services are suspended, food is rationed and people are generally demoralized and destabilized.  It is not hard to imagine how these types of hardships hurt children and parental/spousal relationships.

Defendants’ intentional actions of infliction of emotional distress towards Plaintiffs are not the role nor duty of elected government officials.  This is unconscionable and unacceptable conduct in a civilized society, when the harm is conspired and perpetrated by government actors wrongly perceiving tribal sovereign immunity will shield them from any unlawful act.  This is the worst type of intentional infliction of emotional distress, when the associated harms hurt the children and families of the Anishinabe as a people.  Sadly, the very people who swore to honor and protect the rights of the people are the violators and perpetrators.  The very reasons for the creation of the Klu Klux Klan Act are sadly alive today on LLR.  Now the important remedies and protections that congress intended to protect everyone’s civil rights must come to the Anishinabe people of LLR.


There are many civil rights problems associated with tribal government in Indian country, which will continue to fester and prevent the peoples’ enjoyment of life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, free of tribal government oppression.  The Anishinabe people deserve to have a consistent, fair and just governmental system as provided for in the MCT and US Constitutions. Sadly

[g]iven that the ICRA provides only one remedy – a writ of habeas corpus . . . if a tribe violates ICRA’s Just Compensation Clause by taking property without compensation, or if the tribe violates the ICRA’s Equal Protection Clause and refuses to . . . permit [members] to run for tribal office despite their eligibility, the federal courts are not allowed  to intervene because no detention is involved.  Those persons would have federal rights but no federal remedies.[127]


If this is true, whatever the congressional logic of only providing a writ of habeas corpus as relief and the Martinez Court’s subsequent decision in 1978, Indian country has floundered without enforcement mechanisms for civil rights.  The post, civil war reconstruction era civil rights statutes 42 U.S.C. 1981 et seq lay dormant for nearly seventy years until Black civil rights activists rediscovered these important civil rights enforcement tools.  It is sad to look back at Means and Wounded Knee and see that no meaningful civil rights protections have yet been given to the Anishinabe people by their tribal governments.  Consequently, little progress has been made and the Anishinabe people of LLR still suffer the same governmental neglect and abuses.

            Means shows that §1985 provides an important tool for Indian country, which civil rights protection tools appear to have again lay dormant another 30 years.  It is very apparent that the Anishinabe must rise up to help ourselves as complaints and appeals to the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe and federal authorities has not brought relief.[128]  Yet, too much individual direct action of civil disobedience has all too often resulted in incarceration, like with the peoples’ struggles at Wounded Knee, Camp Truth and/or Camp Justice.  The Anishinabe people should not be forced to resort to acts that result in incarceration and criminal records in hopes of a remedy for civil rights deprivation in 2004.  The Anishinabe people should not be forced to endure, cope and survive tribal governments’ abuses that are routinely condemned as despotic, civil/human rights abuses in Third World counties outside the United States. 

            Defendants have conspired to deprive and deny Plaintiffs of the civil rights protections preserved for the Anishinabe of the MCT as provided in the MCT Constitution which grants to

All members of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe shall be accorded by the governing body equal rights, equal protection, and equal opportunities to participate in the economic resources and activities of the Tribe, and no member shall be denied any of the constitutional rights or guarantees enjoyed by other citizens of the United States, including but not limited to freedom of religion and conscience, freedom of speech, the right to orderly association or assembly, the right to petition for action or the redress of grievances, and due process of law.[129]

The cornerstone for safeguarding and protecting the peoples’ constitutional rights is an independent judicial body.[130]  It is very apparent from Defendants past acts and omissions, alleged herein and with regard to other recent civil rights violations found by the Tribal Court, that the LLRBC Defendants as a government do not understand self-restraint, due process and how to stop blatant displays of cronyism in furtherance of their conspiracy. 

The lead story on the front page of the LLBO newspaper from Chairman Goggleye continues to declare that “it was and still is the [LLRBC’s] position that the Leech Lake Tribal Court did not have the constitutional authority to force the [LLRBC] to certify an individual for candidacy.[131]  Defendants are much more willing to invest time and effort hoping to convince the Anishinabe people of the correctness of Defendants’ choices and conduct rather than change their conduct to honor and protect the peoples’ rights.

Last week, in an opinion published in the Native American Press/Ojibwe News entitled Where are were headed? about the LLRBC, the writer points out that

Instability and incompetence at the top spreads instability and incompetence throughout the whole organization.  Directors and managers are afraid to make decisions, address personnel problems or take initiative because all of it can be overturned on the whim of an RBC member.

            Nearly everyday I hear about someone being abused by the Band. . . .  If the RBC is prepared to blatantly break agreements and contracts with our own people what hope do we have of ever having a government we can trust?  The lack of professional behavior and the inability to separate business from personal is rampant in every part of the Band and Gaming.  People are fired in the most unprofessional way, with little or no proof, but for what appears that they somehow pissed off someone over them and now they don’t have a job.  Our employees have no real recourse to get their issues heard, and their reputations are left tarnished with no way of ever getting the truth out.[132]


The writer continues asking the Anishinabe peoples’ rhetorical questions

When is this going to stop?  When do we really begin to work on restoring the integrity, honor, and fundamental fairness, which are the high values of the Anishinabe Way of Life?[133]


            The Anishinabe people have suffered a long time and the waiting for a future tribal government to finally “get-it” and change for the better, looks like a longer time away.  The Arabs, another tribal culture, have a saying “the limousines never change, only the faces inside.”  Defendants’ actions speak louder than words.  The Anishinabe, sadly, can see what’s happening in their everyday lives but have been powerless to change, prevent or stop the on-going, blatantly unconstitutional, civil rights violations by Defendants as LLRBC government.

Section 1985 provides for federal jurisdiction.  However, the powers of LLR government belong to the Anishinabe people here on LLR and the remedies need to happen here on the LLR, using the legal tools we have at our disposal.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment as follows:

1.         Declaring that Defendants have acted unlawfully and outside the scope of their authority and did conspire to discriminate against and deprive Plaintiffs of their several civil rights under the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §1981 et seq.

2.         Ordering that Plaintiffs are entitled to be returned to their previous or comparable positions with all back pay and benefits due; or in the alternative if Plaintiffs are do not return they will be fully compensated for past quantum meruit, past lost earnings and benefits as well as loss of future earnings.

3.         Declaring that Defendants did act with malicious intent to defame, harm and injure Plaintiffs individually in their person, profession and livelihood and have therefore committed defamatory acts against Plaintiffs for which Defendants are personally and individually liable for damages.

4.         Declaring that Defendants have cause widespread intentional infliction of emotional distress for Plaintiffs’ spouse, children and/or families by causing financial hardship, using public defamation and other overt acts of oppression to publicly ridicule and humiliate and therefore Defendants committed acts causing the intentional infliction of emotional distress to Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ families for which Defendants are personally and individually liable for damages.

5.        Declaring that the Tribal Police acted unlawfully and unconstitutionally when searching and seizing Plaintiffs’ personal possessions, files, work product and other private case information, without a warrant or other lawful court order to aid in Defendants defamation and ridicule to harm Plaintiffs and therefore such items must be returned to the Plaintiff or Plaintiff must be compensated for the damages.

6.         Declaring that Defendants have committed an unjust taking against Plaintiff Bibeau as described above and by not reimbursing his personal costs/expenses in performing his previous job duties which are provided for under the LLBO policies and he must be compensated for the damages.

7.         Ordering that Defendants enter into a Consent Judgment with Plaintiffs to develop an independent LLR civil service commission to establish a merit system for equal rights hiring practices and a termination review board to provide for due process reviews, free of Defendants’ or future RBC’s control and interference.

8.         Ordering Defendants pay attorney fees and costs as provided under 42 U.S.C. 1998(b-c).

9.         Ordering punitive damages for Plaintiffs’ other pain, suffering, losses and general home environment and families’ emotional hardships associated with Defendants’ extreme and outrageous defamatory acts.

10.       Judgment in excess of $2,000,000.00.

11.       For such further relief as the Court may deem just, fair and equitable.



Dated: December 6, 2004                                        [signed] Frank Bibeau

Frank Bibeau
Attorney for Plaintiffs
51124 County Road 118
Deer River, Minnesota

[1] Morris K. Udall – A Lifetime of Service to Arizona and the United States – Selected Speeches "The American Indians and Civil Rights," at American University, October 4, 1965.  See URL:

[2] MCT Const. Art. XIII adopted November 23, 1963, Approved by Asst. Sec. of Interior Carver, March 3, 1964.

[3] Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 codified at 25 U.S.C. 1301 et seq.

[4] Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed. p 345. When government falls to corruption, who receives and keeps employment can be very tenuously based on allegiance to a particular regime or rogue RBC, rather than neutral loyalty to the employer or government.  Often times for Anishinabe people tribal government is the only employment, making take it or leave (at-will employment) all or nothing for some people.

[5] See infra Defamation section page 31 e.g. FNs 107 and 108

[6] See Resolution No. 05-32, attached to Complaint as Exhibit C 6

[7] The broad civil rights violations by the LLRBC increases the fear or intimidation of any employees to publicly support “other” candidates and become unemployed and/or the next target of defamation.

[8] See Press Release dated October 26, 2004 Chairman Goggleye Summarizes Lengthy Tribal Court Process and Actions Regarding LaRose, again rejecting the Tribal Court’s jurisdiction and constitutional authority attached as Exhibit M 1.

[9] See letter from Chairman Goggleye dated August 30, 2004 attached as Exhibit M 7 infra.

[10] See Civil Complaint For Emergency Order filed June 10, 2004, CV-04-108 attached as Exhibit M 2.

[11] See Emergency Ex Parte Order by the Honorable Anita Fineday dated June 10, 2004, CV-04-108.

[12] See copy of Initial Complaint Report No. 20044-03362 attached to Aff. of Frank Bibeau  as Exhibit FB 2. 

[13] See e.g. copy of letter to Kari Demo, Employee Relations from Plaintiff Bibeau dated June 13, 2004 attached to Aff. of Frank Bibeau as Exhibit FB 3. 

[14] See copy of letters attached to Plaintiffs Affs. as Exhibits VB 1 and FB 4.

[15] See Secretary-Treasurer LaRose letter dated June 15, 2004 to MCT President DesChampe attached to Complaint as Exhibit C 2 .  The three Defendant District Representatives; Burton “Luke” Wilson, District 1 Representative, Lyman L. Losh, District 2 Representative, Richard Robinson Jr., District 3 Representative with their attorney Garbow acted in violation of the Governing Bylaws of the Leech Lake Reservation a/k/a Ordinance No. 1, when they conspired to create an “Acting” Chairman. See copy of Ordinance No. 1 attached as Exhibit M 3.

[16] See President DesChampe’s response of the same date to the Leech Lake Tribal Council attached to Complaint as Exhibit C 3).  Secretary-Treasurer LaRose did challenge the legality of Defendants actions and immediately brought those concerns to the attention of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe’s (MCT) President, Norman DesChampe, who responded via letter to the entire Leech Lake Reservation Business Committee (LLRBC) a/k/a Tribal Council.

[17] Also known as constructive terminations.  Plaintiffs Richard Jones, Carrie Kolodji and Roxanne LaRose were allowed to avoid the police and other termination ridicule most Plaintiffs encountered.  However, Plaintiffs McDaniel and White were laid off, yet included in Defendants’ public defamation by memo and group termination.

[18] See letter to Wallace Storbakken dated July 23, 2004, RE: TERMINATION APPEAL (Emphasis in original) attached to Affidavit of Wallace Storbakken as Exhibit WS 2.

[19] See Aff. of Robert Goggleye, Item # 10, who never received a response to his request for appeal letter.

[20] Id., Items # 10 and 11.

[21] LaRose v Wilson et al CV-02-64, LLBO, Wilson v White et al CV-03-81, LLBO, Wilson et al v LaRose CV-04-108, Jackson et al as Election Board members v LLBO, MCT et al CV-04-113, Unemployment Insurance Appeals LLBO versus respective Plaintiffs e.g. BG 3, VB 2, FB 7 and WS 3.

[22] Means et al v. Wilson et al, 522 f. 2d 833 (8th Cir. 1975).

[23] Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed. at 1396.

[24] Davids v. Coyhis, 869 F. Supp. 1401, 1408, (1994), citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 [98 S.Ct. 1670, 1676-77, 56 L.Ed.2d 106] (1978). 

[25] Morrison v. The Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 1998 WL 1031492 (W.D. Mich) citing, Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Manufacturing Techs., Inc., 118 S.Ct. 1700 (1998); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).

[26] Id. citing Weeks Constr., Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Hous. Auth., 797 F.2d 669, 670-71 (9th Cir.1986).

[27] See Wisconsin v. Baker, 698 F.2d 1323 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983).

[28] Morrison v. The Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 1998 WL 1031492 (W.D. Mich)(1998) at 2.

[29] See Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58.

[30] Means at p. 841 citing The specific provision with which we are concerned here is 25 U.S.C. s 1302(8): 25 U.S.C. s 1302. Constitutional Rights No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall (8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of law . . . .

[31] Id.  citing Spotted Eagle v. Blackfeet Tribe, 301 F.Supp. 85, 89-90 (D.Mont.1969).

[32] Id.  citing 25 U.S.C. s 1301. Definitions. For purpose of this subchapter, the term (1) "Indian tribe" means any tribe, band, or other group of Indians subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and recognized as possessing powers of self-government; (2) "powers of self-government" means and includes all governmental powers possessed by an Indian tribe, executive, legislative, and judicial, and all offices, bodies, and tribunals by and through which they are executed, including courts of Indian offenses . . . .

[33] LLBO, Wilson et al v. White et al, CV-03-81, Decision & Order at p. 8, dated September 27, 2004 citing LLBO Judicial Code, Title 1, Part II, Section 2, A.

[34] Id.

[35] LaRose v. Wilson, CV-02-64 Memorandum Decision at p. 6, by Honorable BJ Jones dated January 21, 2003 citing Francis v. Wilkinson, 20 ILR 6028 (NPITCA 1993)(tribal official is not immune from suit for declaratory and injunctive relief for an alleged violation of Indian Civil Rights Act.).  See also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).

[36] Id. at p.7.

[37] See Memo dated May 7, 2003 from Dist. Reps. Wilson, Losh and Robinson to Chairman White and Sec. Treas. LaRose regarding MCT Const. and LLR By-Law Violations attached as Exhibit M 12.

[38] See, e.g., Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 751, 118 S.Ct. 1700;  Santa Clara, 436 U.S. at 56-58, 98 S.Ct. 1670; Ninigret 207 F.3d at 29.  

[39] U.S. v. Oregon, 657 F.2d 1009, 1013 n. 8 (9th Cir.1981);  see also Florida v. Seminole Tribe of Florida, 181 F.3d 1237, 1244-45 (11th Cir.1999);  Tamiami Partners, Ltd. ex rel. Tamiami Dev. Corp. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, 177 F.3d 1212, 1225 (11th Cir.1999) ("[T]ribal   officers are protected by tribal sovereign immunity when they act in their official capacity and within the scope of their authority;  however, they are subject to suit under the doctrine of Ex parte Young when they act beyond their authority.") (footnote omitted), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 196 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir.1999) (Table), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1018, 120 S.Ct. 1419, 146 L.Ed.2d 311 (2000);  Northern States Power Co. v. Prairie Island Mdewakanton Sioux Indian Community, 991 F.2d 458, 460 (8th Cir.1993) (citing Tenneco Oil Co. v. Sac and Fox Tribe of Indians, 725 F.2d 572, 574-75 (10th Cir.1984));  Hardin v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 779 F.2d 476, 479 (9th Cir.1985).

[40] See e.g. Aff. of Frank Bibeau attached as Exhibit FB 1.

[41]See e.g. Exhibits C1 and C2 attached to Complaint.  Chairman White had resigned.  Secretary-Treasurer LaRose was not involved in the conspiracy but was the animus lightening rod or target and actually spoke out against the actions and raised various concerns with the MCT and Tribal Executive Committee.

[42] LaRose was originally served a copy of the Petition in December 2002, and since the three elected Dist. Reps.  (Defendants herein) attempted a series of Removal hearings against LaRose which spawned a variety of tribal court challenges and subsequent case law on sovereignty, constitutional and civil rights.

[43] See Memorandum from Chairman Hunt dated July 16, 2002 used as Exhibit #4 during the Removal hearings of July 30, 2004 and October 5, 2004 attached as Exhibit M 4.

[44] See Ordinance NO. 1, the bylaws governing the duties of the offices and Committee members of the LLRBC previously attached as Exhibit M 3.

[45] See Memo of June 15, 2004, from Secretary-Treasurer LaRose to Norman DesChampe, MCT (Minnesota Chippewa Tribe) President citing to LLBO governing bylaws formally known as Ord. No. 1, attached to Complaint as Exhibit C 3).

[46] See Baker Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Chaske, 28 F.3d 1466, 1471 (8th Cir.1994);  United States v. Yakima Tribal Court, 806 F.2d 853, 860 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069, 107 S.Ct. 2461, 95 L.Ed.2d 870 (1987);  Tenneco Oil Co., 725 F.2d at 576 n. 1.

[47] See Yakima, 806 F.2d at   859-60 ("We do hold that, unlike constitutional violations, there is no per se divestiture of sovereign immunity when statutes or regulations are violated while an agent is pursuing his authorized duties.").

[48] Id.  806 F.2d at 860 (brackets in original) (internal quotations omitted).

[49] Id. citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984).  

[50] MCT Const. Art X, Vacancy and Removals.

[51] LaRose v. Wilson et al, CV-02-64.

[52] Id. Memorandum Decision by the honorable BJ Jones dated January 21, 2003, at p. 9-10. A valid petition for Removal requires at least 20 percent resident eligible voters to be sufficient under MCT Const, Art X.

[53] Zenas Baer was first hired by Defendants on or about January 24, 2003, to carry out the Petitioners’ task of proving the sufficiency of the Petition and/or initiate other actions to support the political removal  LaRose.  (See copy of Resolution No. 03-76 and contract attached as Exhibit M 5).  Zenas Baer engaged in a second contract with Defendants Wilson, Losh and Robinson on or about February 12, 2004 as part of a lawsuit with Defendants to sue the LLBO for payment for Attorney Baer’s services and other LLRBC internal political struggles.  See copy of bootleg, rogue LLRBC Resolution 04- ___ by Defendants to re-hire attorney Baer attached as Exhibit M 6.  See Tribal Court Orders of April 5, 2004, CV-03-103  Baer v. LLBO and CV-04-104  Wilson et al v. White et al.  Attorney Baer’s role/involvement in the instant matter is presently undetermined.

[54] Michael Garbow was previously an attorney with LLBO who left in March of 2002 to work as a local county prosecutor, during which time he was actively involved in the original Removal efforts December 2002 against LaRose and later returned as an agent of Defendants to finally remove LaRose under guise as an attorney serving the entire/all elected LLRBC members but had a known, existing conflict of interest.

[55] See press Release Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe Secretary/Treasurer, Archie LaRose, Petition for Removal Hearing Date Set issued July 21, 2004, Contact: Sally Morrison, the LLRBC “will allow the petitioners’ their due rights.”

[56] See LLBO, Wilson et al v. White et al, CV-03-81 Memorandum Decision & Order by the Honorable Chief Judge Margaret Treuer dated August 29, 2004, at p. 8.

[57] Id.

[58] See Exhibit C 6 attached to Complaint. LL Res. No. 05-32 issued the day prior candidate certification denied candidacy to those the LLRBC stated were “under investigation.” However, the LLRBC did certify Plaintiff Robert Goggleye after declaring investigations about Plaintiff Goggleye in BG 1. See Aff. of Robert Goggleye Item 29, cert’d Candidate Form listing # 11, Robert Goggleye attached as Exhibit BG 6.

[59] Id. at 10.

[60] See letter dated August 30, 2004 to The Honorable Margaret Treuer from Chairman Goggleye pp. 1-4 attached as Exhibit M 7.

[61] See Release dated  August 31, 2004, Leech Lake Tribal Council Decision on Removal Hearing for Former Secretary/Treasurer LaRose is Final, Contact Mike Garbow attached to Aff. of Frank Bibeau as Exhibit FB 6.

[62] See Leech Lake officials stand firm on candidate exclusion, September 1, 2004, By Molly Miron, Pioneer Editor attached as M 8.

[63] See letter dated September 1, 2004 to Norman DesChampe, MCT President from Chairman Goggleye attached as Exhibit M 9).

[64] See Jackson et al v LLRBC et al, CV-04-113 Decision & Order, Memorandum by the Honorable Chief Judge Margaret Treuer dated October 22, 2004.  See particularly the actual hearing record for allegations.

[65] Id.  See also Leech Lake election board members removed September 21, 2004 by Molly Miron, Editor of Bemidji Pioneer and person called to take photos of election board members exiting office after termination attached as Exhibit M 10.

[66] Id. The court hearing record contains testimony that Defendant Wilson was identified as having 800 absentee ballot requests out and that he wanted her to go back into the Election Board office that night to work on absentee ballot requests.

[67] See Memorandum dated August 2, 2004 to the Leech Lake Reservation Tribal Council from Burton “Luke” Wilson regarding Notice of Resignation attached as Exhibit M 13.

[68] See Press Release dated September 28, 2004 FN 9, which is the first time the LLRBC was stating they would now follow the August 29, 2004, Tribal Court order.

[69] Means at 840 citing Griffin v Breckenridge 403 U.S. 88, 102, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971)..

[70] Id. at 841 citing Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co., 507 F.2d 206, 215 (5th Cir. 1975).

[71] Id.  This case differs from those in which there was not a clearly defined class, E. g., Ward v. St. Anthony Hosp., 476 F.2d 671, 676 (10th Cir. 1973); Bricker v. Crane, 468 F.2d 1228, 1233 (1st Cir. 1972), Cert. denied, 410 U.S. 930, 93 S.Ct. 1368, 35 L.Ed.2d 592 (1973), or those in which there was a class, but the alleged conspiratorial discrimination was not Motivated by plaintiffs' class membership. E. g., Arnold v. Tiffany, 487 F.2d 216, 218 (9th Cir. 1973), Cert. denied, 415 U.S. 984, 94 S.Ct. 1578, 39 L.Ed.2d 881 (1974); Hughes v. Ranger Fuel Corp., 467 F.2d 6, 10 (4th Cir. 1972). 42 U.S.C. s 1985(3) does not reach every injury suffered by an individual; that would be tantamount to a general federal tort law, which Congress does not have the power to enact.

[72] Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608, 610 (6th Cir. 1973).

[73] Griffin at 97.

[74] Means citing Griffin at 106.

[75] Id. citing Brown v. United States, 486 F.2d 658, 661 (8th Cir. 1973); Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700, 704-705 (8th Cir. 1973); White Eagle v. One Feather,478 F.2d 1311, 1314 (8th Cir. 1973).

[76] Id. citing White Eagle v. One Feather, supra, 478 F.2d at 1314.

[77] Id. Supra.

[78] Means citing Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d 529, 531-532 (8th Cir. 1967); Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 134-135 (10th Cir. 1959).

[79] Id. citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559, 8 L.Ed. 483 (1832), and does not protect a tribal subject from suit. Seneca Constitutional Rights Organization v. George, 348 F.Supp. 48, 49 (W.D.N.Y.1972).

[80] Means citing Griffin at 101-102.

[81] Id. at 104,; Action v. Gannon,450 F.2d 1227, 1233 (8th Cir. 1971).

[82] Id. at 105-106.

[83] Id. at 106.

[84] See Tribal Chairman George Goggleye Jr.’s response to Archie LaRose, Native American Press/Ojibwe News (NAP/ON) Vol. 17, Issue 5, July 16, 2004 at p. 4.

[85] Id.

[86] See The truth about Pete and Archie’s Executive orders, (NAP/ON) Vol. 17, Issue 5, July 16, 2004 at p. 4.

[87] Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed., p 1127.

[88] Id. at p 246. (Emphasis added). See also LLBO HR Policies and Procedures Section 200.1 and 200.2 Rating system “The division must take into consideration factors relevant to the position.  For example: education, experience, the knowledge, skills and abilities to perform the job duties of the position successfully.”

[89] Id. citing an Act of Congress on January 16, 1883, codified under 5 U.S.C.A. § 1101.

[90] Id.

[91] See Jones v. Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe, CV-01-33, Findings, Conclusions & Judgment by the Honorable Margaret Treuer, Chief Judge of Leech Lake Tribal Court, dated August 6, 2002.

[92] Id. See Memorandum at p. 2.

[93] See FN 14.

[94] See LaRose v. Wilson, CV-02-64, Memorandum Decision by the Honorable BJ Jones, Deputy Judge Leech Lake Tribal Court dated January 21, 2003 at pp. 7-8, citing Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).

[95] Id. citing Loudermill at 546, 548.

[96] Id. e.g. CV-02-64, CV-03-81m CV-04-108 inter alia

[97] See Ross v. Leech Lake Tribal College Board of Trustees CV-03-88, Memorandum Decision & Order by the Honorable Margaret Treuer dated October 24, 2003.

[98] Id. at p. 2.

[99] The Mn/DEED determines each individual claimant’s eligibility for Unemployment Insurance benefits based upon reasons for separations (terminations).  Mn/DEED also provides an appeal process which was used by Defendants with several terminated Plaintiffs, unsuccessfully.

[100] See FN 14.

[101] See FN 108, Exhibit m 11.

[102] Minn. Stat. 609.765, subd. 1.

[103] Id. at subd. 2.

[104] See Bersch v Rgnonti & Associates, 584 N.W.2d 783, 137 Lab.Cas. P 58,579, 14 IER Cases 829 (Minn. App. 1998) citing Ferrell v. Cross, 557 N.W.2d 560, 565 (Minn.1997).

[105] Id. citing Foley v. WCCO Television, Inc., 449 N.W.2d 497, 500 (Minn.App.1989), review denied (Minn. Feb. 9, 1990).

[106] See e.g. Exhibits BG 1 and WS 1.  See also e.g. BG 5, VB 2 and FB 4, memos unnecessarily use inflammatory, defamatory language to inhibit and prevent future re-employment in the local employment markets.

[107] See Luke Wilson speaks out, NAP/ON Vol. 17, Iss. 19, October 22, 2004, p. 4-5.

[108] See A response to Wagosh and What’s up By Burton “Luke” Wilson, Candidate for Secretary-Treasurer issued on or about September 28, 2004.  Defendant Wilson was/is currently seated as the duly elected Dist 1 Rep.  The response was to two unidentified writers in the NAP/ON, which was distributed to LLBO employees and to Gaming employees, during work time via inter-office mail attached as Exhibit M 11.

[109] Id.

[110] See INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS by Gerald T. Laurie, Esq. and David A. Harbeck Esq. This article is an excerpt from the 1995 Employment Law Handbook, published by the Minnesota Trial Lawyers Association, (hereinafter “1995 Emp. Law Hdbk.”) citing Hubbard v. United Press International. Inc.. 330 N.W.2d 428, 438-39 (Minn. 1983). Hubbard expressly adopted these elements from the Second Restatement of Torts, § 46.

[111] Id. citing Hubbard. 330 N.W.2d at 439 (citations omitted).

[112] Id. citing Glass v. IDS Financial Services. 778 F. Supp. 1029, 1073 (D. Minn. 1991).

[113] Id. directing to Vinson v. Linn-Mar Community Sch. Dist.. 360 N.W.2d 108, 118 (Iowa 1984).

[114] Id. citing Glass, 778 F. Supp. at 1073-74.

[115] Ordinance No. 1 more commonly known as the governing bylaws of the LLRBC, adopted October 7, 1964 by the LLRBC, previously attached as Exhibit M 3.

[116] See FN 110, 1995 Emp. Law Hdbk. citing e.g. Boyle v.Wenk. 392 N.E.2d 1053, 1055-56 (Mass. 1979).

[117] See e.g. Jackson et al as LLBO Election Board Members v. LLRBC et al, CV-04-113, LLBO, Wilson et al v. White and LaRose CV-03-81.

[118] See FN 110, 1995 Emp. Law Hdbk  citing e.g. Baker v. Weyerhaeuser Co.. 903 F.2d 1342, 1347 (10th Cir. 1990).

[119] LLRBC Defendants had previously hired attorney Baer in LaRose v Wilson CV-02-64 when the initial due process Tribal Court decision cited to Cleveland Board of Education v Loudermill supra which involved a governmental employer’s denial of fundamental due process rights for a governmental employee, following an arbitrary termination without notice or opportunity to respond before deprivation of governmental employment, which is a significant property right.

[120] See FN 110, 1995 Emp. Law Hdbk citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46, Comment i

[121] Id. citing Domfeld v. Oberg. 503 N.W.2d 115, 119-20 (Minn. 1993).For instance, in order for a plaintiff to prevail, the conduct must be"directed at" the plaintiff and the defendant must know of the plaintiffs presence so that the mental effect upon the plaintiff can be anticipated by the defendant.   Printing in public newspapers or publicly disseminating to other LLBO employees in the workplace who pass on the written memorandums to Plaintiffs is part of the Defendants’ goal.

[122] Id. citing Hubbard. 330 N.W.2d at 439; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 comment j (1965).

[123] Id. citing Bohdan. 411 N.W.2d at 908.

[124] Id. citing 1 Paul H. Tobias, Litigating Wrongful Discharge Claims § 6.08 (1992).

[125]  Id. citing Bohdan. 411 N.W.2d at 908.

[126] Declaration of Independence, 1776, see also Means v. Wilson, for part of the overall Wounded Knee struggles for Indian civil rights and stop tribal governments’ unconstitutional oppression and abuses.

[127] See Stephen L. Pevar,  The rights of Indians and tribes: the authoritative ACLU guide to Indian and tribal rights (An American Civil Liberties Union handbook) at 283 (3rd ed. pub 1992 and 2002).

[128] See letter from US Attorney Thomas Heffelfinger dated June 28, 2004 to Secretary-Treasurer LaRose attached as Exhibit M 12, saying that “in response to your request for prompt assistance regarding an illegal takeover of governmental control . . . it is not the practice of [US DOJ] to intervene in internal tribal electoral matters.”  Adding that DOJ “expects all . . . tribal officials . . . to comply with all tribal laws . . . .”

[129] MCT Const., Art. XIII.

[130] Id. provides that All MCT members shall not “be denied any of the constitutional rights or guarantees enjoyed by other citizens of the United States” which is a truly independent judiciary.

[131] Chairman Goggleye Summarizes Lengthy Tribal Court Process and Actins Regarding LaRose, DeBahJiMon – A Publication of the LLBO, Vol. XVIV, No. 17, Nov. 2004 p. 1.

[132] See Where are we headed? By Larry Hardy, NAP/ON, Vol. 17. Iss. 24, Nov. 26, 2004 at p. 4.

[133] Id.