Confidential
Draft Report
“Enforcement
of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968”
May 1990
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first, Red Fox v.
Red Fox, [56], the
Oregon Court of Appeals was confronted with whether to recognize a
tribal court judgment claimed to be void because the tribal court
refused to allow one of the parties to be represented by an
attorney. The court of appeals recognized the tribal court
judgment, saying that: [W]hile
husband was advised that his retained counsel--a member of the Oregon
and federal bars--would not be permitted to appear before the Tribal
Court, the record shows that he was also informed that he might be
represented by a "spokesman" certified to make such an appearance. ...
[O]ne is not deprived of a "right" to representation because a court
will not permit a specific individual to appear before it. No
constitutional claim arises from the limitation of representation of
those satisfying specific qualifications where those so qualified are,
in fact, available to a litigant.[57]
The court of appeals refrained from addressing whether an ICRA due process claim was to be interpreted consistently with a constitutional due process claim. That issue was before a federal district court.[58] That suit, later __________ [56] 542 P.2d 918 (Or. Ct. App. 1975) [57] Id. at 922 (footnote omitted). [58] Id. at 922 n.8 ("A federal cause of action is available to the parties alleging that a deprivation of rights created by the [Indian] Civil Rights Act. Indeed, we are informed at oral argument that such an "appeal" from the Tribal Court decree is now pending in the federal district court, (continued...)
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